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The Confrontation of the Legislative And Executive
Branches: An Examination of the Constitutional
Balance of Powers and the Role of the Attorney
General
The United States Constitution created an internally dependent tripar-
tite governing scheme which relied upon a carefully drafted system of
checks and balances as a means of self-regulation. Recent years have seen
increased conflicts between the separate branches, the most recent of which
is the occasion for this article. The article traces the rise and fall of the
power exercised by the various branches and then focuses on the recent
confrontation between Congress and the executive branch concerning the
actions of the Environmental Protection Agency and the subsequent resig-
nation of Anne McGill Burford. Of particular interest to this inquiry is the
role of the Attorney General of the United States during inter-branch con-
frontations. The article concludes that congressional inertia has led to a
distortion of both the roles of the President and the Attorney General and
then examines methods for restoring the branches to their proper constitu-
tional roles.
I. INTRODUCTION
The American Constitution introduced a new concept to a na-
tion still in its infancy -- the separation of powers., The founding
fathers attempted to draft a workable compromise between two
conflicting realizations: the need for a central repository of power
in a strong federal government and the fear of the corruption that
often accompanies such a consolidation of power. The solution
was found in a series of checks and balances, a system creating
three separate, yet by necessity, coordinate branches of federal
government.2 The Constitution thus implemented an internally
1. The concept of separation of powers was unknown in the eighteenth cen-
tury and still remains a rare form of government today. Prior to the eighteenth
century, the general belief was that an effective government required a unification
of authority. Our founding fathers, however, chose to adopt a tripartite system -
with a legislative, executive, and judiciary branch - as a means of allocating con-
stitutional power. This system is known as checks and balances. A. SCHLESINGER,
JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY Vii (1973) [hereinafter cited as SCHLESINGER].
2. The theory of separation of powers is based, in part, upon a belief that
there are limits to which one individual may push another without the latter push-
ing back. The theory, although a simplistic approach, is nonetheless an accurate
reading of human nature. "'But the [same] great security against a gradual con-
centration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to
those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
dependent tripartite governing scheme which relied upon a care-
fully drafted system of checks and balances as a means of self-
regulation. The system, as noted by Justice Brandeis, was in-
tended "not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power."3
Recent years have seen an increase in conflicts between the
separate branches, the most recent of which is the occasion for
this article. The confrontation involved Congress and the execu-
tive branch of the Reagan administration concerning the actions
of the Environmental Protection Agency and the subsequent res-
ignation of Anne McGill Burford. Of particular interest to this in-
quiry is the role played by the Attorney General of the United
States during inter-branch confrontations. The Department of
Justice not only ignored a valid contempt of Congress citation,
but it also filed a lawsuit against the Congress. The actions of all
three branches provide an interesting study of the separation of
powers.
The term "separation of powers" is itself a misnomer. Although
the functions of the federal government are apportioned into
three divisions, each branch must rely upon the other two in or-
der to see its policies effectuated. This reliance has created cer-
tain gray zones between the clear boundaries which separate the
duties and powers of each branch. These zones of uncertainty
serve to demonstrate the foresight of the drafters of our Constitu-
tion. Instead of defining a rigid and precisely delineated govern-
mental structure, the founding fathers envisioned a Constitution
which would be capable of evolving concurrently with the newly
created nation.4
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others." THE FEDERAUST, No. 51,
at 337 (J. Madison), (Modern Library ed. 1937).
3. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis went on to state that "[tihe purpose was, not to avoid friction,
but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the govern-
mental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy." Id.
4. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall articulately expressed the view, and necessity,
of a living, growing Constitution in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
407 (1819), stating that:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may
be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code,
and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably
never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated,
and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from
the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by
the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from
the nature of the instrument, but from the language. Why else were some
of the limitations, found in the ninth section of the 1st article, introduced?
It is also, in some degree, warranted by their having omitted to use any
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The zones of uncertainty and flexibility, as to specific alloca-
tions of power, allowed room for the continuing spirit of balance
and compromise; however, the survival of an effective system of
separation of powers depends, by definition, upon the continued
assertions by each branch of its respective powers. A failure by
one branch to exercise its constitutionally authorized checks will
result in a corresponding shift in the constitutional balance of
powers. It is the author's position that Congress has failed to
fully exercise its constitutionally mandated authority.5 This fail-
ure contributed to the creation of what Arthur Schlesinger has
termed The Imperial Presidency.6 Accordingly, Congress, and
only Congress, is the appropriate body to reestablish the constitu-
tional balance between the legislature and the presidency. As
stated so aptly by Mr. Justice Jackson, "[i]f not good law, there
was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that
'The tools belong to the man who can use them.' We may say that
power ... belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress
itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers." 7
This article examines the problem of assuring an adequate dif-
fusion of executive information to the legislative branch. This in-
cludes the role of Congress in obtaining the information
necessary to legislate effectively and to monitor the personnel of
various agencies and commissions and the necessary interaction
with the President and, more particularly, the United States At-
torney General. This article examines the evolution of the shift of
the constitutional scales as well as arguing for the restoration of
the constitutional balance of power between the two branches. 8
restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and just interpre-
tation. In considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it is a
constitution we are expounding.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. Although Congress has allowed invasions by both the executive and judi-
cial branch, this article will focus primarily on the confrontations between the leg-
islative and executive branch.
6. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 1.
7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) [hereinafter cited as the Steel Seizure Case].
8. The system of checks and balances supplied by the Constitution relies, in
part, on the spirit of compromise in order to operate in an effective manner. The
continued failure by the branches to exercise their constitutionally granted
checks, as well as adopting a degree of self-restraint in other areas, may ultimately
be the downfall of a working tripartite system. When all inter-branch conflicts are
deferred to judicial resolution rather than mutual compromise, the practical result
would be the creation of an unworkable governmental system; judicial resolution
II. CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
A. The Power to Investigate Executive Conduct
The role of Congress in investigating the actions of the execu-
tive branch dates back to the origins of our nation. Congress was
entrusted with both the power and the duty to investigate the ex-
ecutive to ensure that the President is faithfully performing his
duties-a sort of "grand inquest."9 Such authorization is not
found within the text itself; yet, to question the source of the au-
thority is not to deny the power itself.1o
Power is seldom unaccompanied by a corresponding duty. To
function properly within a government of allocated powers, it is
the duty of each branch to maintain its own realm of authority.
The power entrusted to Congress is one which only Congress it-
self is capable of protecting. In 1944, then Senator Truman stated
his belief in the importance of congressional investigations: "In
my opinion, the power of investigation is one of the most impor-
tant powers of Congress. The manner in which that power is ex-
ercised will largely determine the position and prestige of the
Congress in the future." While some may doubt Truman's as-
sessment of the importance of congressional inquiry,12 his estima-
of every dispute between the two branches would be so inefficient that the system
would eventually grind to a halt waiting for the court to make the necessary
determinations.
9. During the Constitutional Convention, references were made to the effect
that the House of Representatives was to act as the "grand inquest of the nation."
2 ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION II (2d ed. 1836); 2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 154 (1937). In his comprehensive study on executive privi-
lege, Professor Berger has placed a significant amount of importance on the
"grand inquest" references. See R. BERGER, EXEcUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONsTrru-
TIONAL MYTH (1974) [hereinafter cited as BERGER]. On the other hand, Philip Kur-
land has stated his belief that the reference was intended to be limited to the
impeachment power. The exact quotation was: 'The House of Representatives
shall be the grand Inquest of this Nation; and all Impeachments shall be made by
them." See P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTrrUTION 19 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as P. KURLAND]. Regardless of the degree of importance properly attributa-
ble to the "grand inquest" reference, the subsequent actions of the Congress, i.e.,
the St. Clair Inquiry, indicate a clear belief by Congress that it was intended to
perform investigatory functions. See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
10. For example, the exact source for the authority of the Supreme Court to
review the propriety of congressional actions is also a matter of uncertainty. How-
ever, the continual acquiescence by the other branches of government, as to the
validity of that power, has firmly established the power of judicial review as one
beyond question today. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 147 (1803).
11. See D. RIDDLE, THE TRUMAN COMMITTEE (1964).
12. For example, Rep. Lindsay C. Warren (D. N.C.) stated in 1935 that "[in
my opinion, 95 percent of these investigations are absolutely worthless and noth-
ing has been accomplished by them." M. MCGEARY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CON-
GRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE POWER 7 (1966). Walter Lippman once stated his belief
"that legalized atrocity, the congressional investigation, in which congressmen,
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tion that the power of Congress will ultimately be determined by
the use of the investigatory process appears to have hit the mark.
Congressional investigations were first utilized in 1792 when
Congress began to investigate the defeat of the American Army,
under the guidance of General St. Clair, by the Indians at the Wa-
bash River on November 4, 1792.13 The investigation was sparked
by the Secretary of War's questionable report to Congress that
the defeat was due to "a deficient number of good troops."' 4 Un-
satisfied with the explanation, Congress began its first
investigation.
The infant nation became aware of the importance of the prece-
dent which would be established during the course of the inquiry.
General St. Clair, who had led the American troops to defeat, had
himself asked for a court of inquisition to absolve him of any
wrongdoing; President Washington declined his request. Con-
gress struggled in an attempt to define its constitutional role in
the events which were unfolding. Congressman Vining of Dela-
ware believed the role of Congress was premised upon its im-
peachment power.'5 He believed that because Congress had been
expressly given the power to impeach it must also have the im-
plied power to conduct necessary investigations leading to an im-
peachment. Congressman Smith of South Carolina opposed the
notion of implied authority, believing that it was the President
who had the authority to investigate the Army's actions. 16 This
belief was premised on the fact that the execution of the laws of
the United States had been entrusted to the executive branch.
Thus, Smith thought that the duty to investigate belonged to
Washington, rather than to Congress. Congress, however, chose
to exercise its own authority.' 7
starved of their legitimate food for thought, go on a wild and feverish manhunt,
and do not stop at cannibalism." C. PRITCHETr, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 214
(1968).
13. A resolution was passed by the House of Representatives requesting the
President to have the proper individuals "lay before this House such papers of a
public nature" which might aid the House in its investigation of St. Clair's defeat.
P. KURLAND, supra note 9, at 22.
14. 1 SCHLESINGER & BRUNS, CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A DOCUMENTED HIS-
TORY 1792-1974 8 (1975) (five volume set) [hereinafter cited as SCHLESINGER &
BRUNS]. The lack of good troops was an answer too simple to satisfy anyone.
15. See P. KURLAND, supra note 9, at 21-22.
16. Id.
17. Most of the members of the House were aware of the precedent-set-
ting aspects of the proposal, but they also believed the virtual destruction
of the nation's military force and the huge expenditure of funds de-
The House requested documents and information from the
President which would facilitate its investigation. Aware of the
significance of his response, President Washington called a rare
meeting of his cabinet to obtain its views on a proper response to
the congressional request:
Jefferson noted that the group reached unanimity on the essential
points: the House could conduct an inquest, institute inquiries, and call
for papers. The President, however, could release such papers as the
"public good would permit and ought to refuse those the disclosure of
which would injure the public." Jefferson wrote that neither the House
nor the committee had a right to call on department heads to release
records. Requests for Executive records were to be made directly to the
President.1 8
The significance of the executive's response was two-fold. First,
it gave birth to a concept which has become known as "executive
privilege."19 Second, and perhaps of greater importance, it estab-
lished executive recognition of the power and legitimacy of Con-
gress to investigate, and by logical necessity, demand the
production of information from the executive. The ultimate result
of the St. Clair affair was that the President turned over to the
House all the documents it had requested. 20
manded a public accounting. The motion [to establish a committee of in-
quiry] passed on a vote of 44 to 10.
SCHLESINGER & BRUNS, supra note 14, at 10 (quoted in P. KURLAND, supra note 9, at
22).
18. Id. at 4 (quoted in P. KURLAND, supra note 9, at 22).
19. Almost every administration since 1792 has faced some confrontation with
Congress concerning the use of "executive privilege." Stated in the simplest of
terms, executive privilege refers to the practice of the executive branch to deny
access to certain information which it has in its possession in spite of congres-
sional (or possibly judicial) requests, or on occasion, demands for access to the
information. Despite the repeated invocation of the "privilege," the propriety of its
use is still a matter both of constitutional uncertainty and controversy.
Nonetheless, although not precisely defining the scope of the privilege, the
Supreme Court has stated that some kind of "animal" does exist and that "[t]he
privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted
in the separation of powers under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
Notwithstanding the apparent difference of opinion between the Court and Pro-
fessor Berger, the two may actually be in agreement. See BERGER, supra note 9, at
1. Berger was discussing the authority of the executive to withhold information
from Congress, whereas the Supreme Court was discussing the withholding of in-
formation from a federal criminal trial proceeding. The Court acknowledged the
narrowness of its holding in a footnote:
We are not here concerned with the balance between the President's gen-
eralized interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in
civil litigation, nor with that between the confidentiality interest and con-
gressional demands for information, nor with the President's interest in
preserving state secrets. We address only the conflict between the Presi-
dent's assertion of a generalized privilege of confidentiality and the consti-
tutional need for relevant evidence in criminal trials.
Id. at 712 n.19 (emphasis added). Therefore, the direct conflict between Congress
and the executive branch has yet to be examined by the current Court.
20. P. KURLAND, supra note 9, at 22.
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The St. Clair inquiry established the legitimacy of congres-
sional inquiries. Once that power was established, the precise
grounds upon which it was based became a matter of academic
inquiry. The authority resided either within the power to im-
peach or within the duty to inform the public of the actions of the
executive branch. Perhaps the power was borrowed from the es-
tablished practices of the sixteenth century British House of
Commons,21 although parliamentary inquiries were primarily
political in nature.22 Woodrow Wilson once asserted that "[t]he
information function of Congress should be preferred even to its
legislative function."23 Suffice it to say that the power is generally
recognized as a necessary counterpart, an intrinsic component, of
the power to legislate. This power, however, is not limited to the
need of obtain information for the purpose of drafting legislation.
B. The Power to Punish for Contempt
1. The Inherent Power of Contempt
Historically, the power of contempt has been considered a nec-
essary means of self-defense and self-preservation. "Incarcera-
tion by the legislature was not an end in itself but a means to an
end, i.e., the freedom to perform its public duties which could
only be obtained by imprisonment of the [offending party]. "24
21. The House of Commons first utilized its power to investigate its own mem-
bership. The power was later expanded to investigate and oversee other govern-
mental officials who had been entrusted with responsibility. The drafters of the
Constitution were so aware of this practice that they assumed it to be such an in-
trinsic part of the power to legislate that it was not deemed necessary to expressly
grant this authority through the document itself. See CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 142-43 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE TO
CONGRESS].
22. Despite the apparent similarities between the British House of Commons
and the American Congress, the underlying functions of the Common's inquiries
were quite different from those of Congress. The inquiries by the House of Com-
mons were essentially politically motivated, seeking to point out the past failures
of one faction or another - their purpose was rarely a search for the truth. Addi-
tionally, the House of Commons was granted quasi-judicial powers, i.e., the power
to prescribe bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. These powers were ex-
pressly rejected by the founding fathers. Therefore, any arguments that the power
of inquiry of the Congress was derived from the English Parliamentary system
must be balanced against the inherent differences between the two legislative
bodies. See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 21.
23. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1967).
24. State ex rel. Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d 282, 291, 171 N.W.2d 192, 195-96
(1969), rev'd on other groun-, 404 U.S. 496 (1972) (stemming from a writ of habeas
Like the investigative power, the power of Congress to hold an in-
dividual in contempt cannot be found within the Constitution.25
The power of contempt is an inherent governmental power which
traces its origins to parliamentary procedures dating back to Eliz-
abethan times. 26 The power is a necessary counterpart to the
power to investigate. Without the power to summarily discipline
a defiant or reluctant witness, the congressional power of investi-
gation would be of little or no value.
The roots of the contempt power lie somewhere within the
practices of the British Parliament; however, the value of the Brit-
ish precedent has been questioned on the grounds that Parlia-
ment, as opposed to Congress, derived its power from an
"assumed blending of the legislature and judicial authority pos-
sessed by Parliament when the House of Lords and the Commons
were one ... ,"27 Regardless of its form, legislative or judicial,
the substance of the power cannot be denied. Stated simply, it is
the power of effective self-preservation.
In 1821, the constitutionality of congressional use of summary
contempt proceedings power was upheld in Anderson v. Dunn. 28
The Supreme Court held that the power to legislate created an
implied right in Congress to preserve itself, i.e., to deal with direct
obstructions of its legislative duties by way of contempt. 29 With-
out such a power, Congress would be "exposed to every indignity
and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may
corpus for release of a protester who briefly took over the Wisconsin legislature
and was subsequently imprisoned for contempt).
25. One narrow exception exists. The Constitution does provide Congress
with the power to punish its own members. "Each House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with
the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
26. For a history on the contempt power, see generally, C. BECK, CONTEMPT OF
CONGRESS (1959) [hereinafter cited as C. BECK); R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT
POWER (1963) [hereinafter cited as R. GOLDFARB I.
27. 44 Wis. at 292, 171 N.W.2d at 196. Parliament, being originally a judicial
body, exercised judicial powers concurrently with its legislative powers. Landis,
Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV.
L. REV. 153, 159-60 (1926). Professor Redlich contends that the contempt power
grew out of the functions of Parliament as a supreme representative assembly.
See I REDLICH, PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 24, 25 (1908). Another com-
mentator has argued, however, that the House of Commons was basically no more
of a judicial body than the House of Representatives. See Potts, Power of Legisla-
tive Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1926).
28. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). The action arose out of an attempt by John
Anderson to bribe a member of the House of Representatives to help him push
through a land claim. Anderson was given a summary trial, reprimanded and re-
leased. He subsequently brought an action for assault and battery against the
Sergeant at Arms, Thomas Dunn. The lower court as well as the Supreme Court
ruled against Anderson, thus upholding the contempt power of Congress. See R.
GOLDFARB, supra note 26, at 163.
29. Id. at 228-34.
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mediate against it."30 The Court, however, did limit the authority
to "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed," and
held that imprisonment of an individual could not extend beyond
the adjournment of Congress. 31 The Court held that while the
contempt power of the House of Commons was not applicable to
Congress because of the limits of its delegated powers, nonethe-
less Congress did possess certain limited implied powers of con-
tempt. The contempt power was deemed ancillary and incidental
to the legislative powers granted Congress. 32
The Court has continued to uphold the authority of Congress to
invoke its summary contempt power.3 3 "The past decisions of
this Court expressly recognizing the power of the Houses of the
Congress to punish contemptuous conduct leave little question
that the Constitution imposes no general barriers to the legisla-
tive exercise of such power." 34 Furthermore, there is no reason
why the contempt power of a legislature should be any different
than the contempt power of a court. "A legislature, like a court,
must, of necessity, possess the power to act 'immediately' and 'in-
stantly' to quell disorders in the chamber if it is to be able to
30. Id. at 228. The Court stated its belief in the necessity of the contempt
power:
But if there is one maxim which necessarily rides over all others, in the
practical application of government, it is, that the public functionaries
must be left at liberty to exercise the powers which the people have en-
trusted to them. The interests and dignity of those who created them, re-
quire the exertion of the powers indispensable to the attainment of the
ends of their creation.
Id. at 226.
31. Id. at 231 (emphasis omitted).
32. The Court stated the significance of the implied power.
On this principle it is, that Courts of justice are universally acknowledged
to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect,
and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates,
and, as a corollary to this proposition, to preserve themselves and their of-
ficers from the approach and insults of pollution.
Id. at 227.
33. See Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d 282, 171 N.W.2d 192 (1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 496 (1972). The Court reversed the contempt conviction on the
grounds that the State Legislature of Wisconsin had waited two days after the al-
legedly contemptuous acts to sentence the defendant and that he had been denied
notice of the charges and an opportunity to answer. The contempt conviction was
found to have violated the defendant's procedural due process rights. The defend-
ant had been denied both notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard. In
spite of the reversal, the body of the opinion upheld the general authority, and ne-
cessity, of a legislative body to invoke the contempt power.
34. 404 U.S. at 499. See, e.g., Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); Ander-
son v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
maintain its authority and continue with -the proper dispatch of
its business." 35
2. The Addition of the Criminal Contempt Statute
The creation of a contempt statute, in addition to the common
law power of contempt, was first proposed by Thomas Jefferson.
He believed that Congress should enact legislation which would
specifically delineate the scope of the contempt power "thereby
hanging up a rule for the inspection of all" potential offenders.3 6
In 1857, Congress enacted a statute defining the scope of a new
statutory power of contempt.37 The motivation for this additional
remedy appears to have been two-fold. The statute allowed Con-
gress to transfer a lengthy and laborious process to the judicial
branch. Additionally, and perhaps of greater importance at the
time, the statute provided a means for increasing the punishment
of contemptuous individuals.38
The statute was created in a reaction to the comments of Mr. J.
W. Simonton, 'a journalist with the New York Times, who had
stated that certain members of Congress had offered to sell him
their votes. He was subsequently called before Congress and
stated that he could not answer the questions asked of him be-
35. 404 U.S. at 503-04 (emphasis added).
36. 2 HINDs, PRECEDENTS § 1597 (1907) (containing comments by Jefferson).
37. The Act of 1857. Section 1 of the Act provided:
That any person summoned as a witness by the authority of either House
of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter
before either House, or any committee of either House of Congress, who
shall willfully make default, or who, appearing, shall refuse to answer any
question pertinent to the matter of inquiry in consideration before the
House or committee by which he shall be examined, shall in addition to
the pains and penalties now existing, be liable to indictment as and for a
misdemeanor, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction
thereof, and on conviction, shall pay a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars and not less than one hundred dollars, and suffer imprisonment in
the common jail not less than one month nor more than twelve months.
11 Stat. 155 (1857) (emphasis added).
A third section was added which stated that:
Then when a witness shall fail to testify as provided in the previous sec-
tions of this act, and the facts shall be reported to the House, it shall be
the duty of the Speaker of the House or the President of the Senate to cer-
tify the fact under the seal of the House or Senate to the district attorney
for the District of Columbia, whose duty it shall be to bring the matter
before the grand jury for their action.
Id.
38. The penalty provided for a possible monetary fine (up to one thousand dol-
lars) and imprisonment up to twelve months. The twelve month period may have
extended beyond the adjournment of Congress, thereby potentially increasing the
duration of confinement. See supra note 37. Recall that under the holding of An-
derson v. Dunn, a party could not be imprisoned beyond a period when Congress
adjourned. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 11: 331, 1984] Constitutional Balance of Powers
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
cause to do so would be a breach of confidence.39
The dilemma before Congress was that, under the rule of An-
derson v. Dunn, 40 Mr. Simonton could not be imprisoned beyond
the session of Congress. Consequently, because the proceedings
had not commenced until January 21, 1857, and the Thirty-fourth
Congress was due to adjourn on March 4, 1857, the maximum
term of imprisonment could not exceed the six week period. This
was believed to be an insufficient punishment for one found to be
in contempt of Congress. Accordingly, legislation was proposed
to enable Congress to impose a punishment of greater duration. 41
Shortly thereafter the Act of 185742 was passed. The Act allowed
criminal sanctions to be imposed against an individual who re-
fused to provide information requested by either chamber.
In spite of this new weapon, however, the majority of contuma-
cious witnesses from 1857 to 1876 were punished under the previ-
ously recognized inherent power of contempt.43 Even Simonton,
the impetus of the legislative action, was not punished under the
new statute. Nonetheless, when one examines the general pur-
pose of the power, this result is not surprising. The power of con-
finement was employed in the belief that a few days imprison-
ment would tend to induce a witness to cooperate. Con-
gress undoubtedly preferred to keep a close watch over the stub-
39. See Moreland, Cong7essional Investigations and Private Persons, 40 S.
CAL. L. REV. 189, 203-04 (1967).
40. See supra notes 28-32.
41. Representative Orr spoke in support of the proposed legislation:
Suppose that two days before the adjournment of this Congress there is a
gross attempt on the privileges of the House by corrupt means of any
description: then the power of this House to punish extends only to those
two days. Is that an adequate punishment? Ought we not, then, to pass at
once a law which will make the authority of the House respected; and, in
addition to that, after this bill has passed, this House will turn these mat-
ters over to the courts-tribunals which have the time, education, and fa-
cilities, for investigating such charges? This House cannot undertake to
constitute itself a court to determine all these things, because it would
consume too much of its time. Our entire session might be exhausted by
them, if there were a series of contempts.
CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess. 406 (1857).
42. 11 Stat. 155 (1857). The statute was intended to be an addition, not substi-
tution, to the concurrent common law power of contempt. This was expressly
stated in the language of the original statute: "[I] n addition to the pains and pen-
alties now existing .. " 11 Stat. 155. See supra note 37 for the text of the statute.
43. See Moreland, supra note 39; Senate Comm. on Privileges and Elections,
Precedents, S. Misc. Doc. No. 68, 52d Cong., 2d Sess. 45-101 (1893) (for a list of the
contempt actions in the Senate from 1857-92).
born witness, rather than turn the individual over to the courts,
thus placing him out of the reach of the committee. Because of
pressing time constraints on the Congress and the growth of court
review of summary congressional punishment, however, the Con-
gress began to turn more frequently to prosecutions under the
statute of 1857. As a result, the statute has become the exclusive
remedy for congressional contempt citations since 1945.44
3. The Use of the Contempt Power
Between 1789 and 1976 Congress voted to issue 384 contempt ci-
tations. 45 The citations were primarily aimed at a witness who re-
fused to do one of three things: appear before a committee,
answer questions asked of him, or produce requested documents.
The majority of these citations occurred subsequent to 1945 as a
result of the actions of the House Un-American Activities Com-
44. See GUIDE TO CONGRESS 143 (2d ed. 1976). The statutes were incorporated
with minor revisions in the United States Revised Statutes as §§ 102, 103 and 104.
The statutes in their current form provide that:
§ 192. Refusal of witness to testify or produce papers
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority
of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon
any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee es-
tablished by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Con-
gress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes
default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question perti-
nent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and
imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than
twelve months.
§ 193. Privilege of witnesses No witness is privileged to refuse to testify
to any fact, or to produce any paper, respecting which he shall be ex-
amined by either House of Congress, or by any joint committee estab-
lished by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress,
or by any committee of either House, upon the ground that his testimony
to such fact or his production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or
otherwise render him infamous.
8 194. Certification of failure to testify or produce; grand jury action
Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned in section 192 of this title
fails to appear to testify or fails to produce any books, papers, records, or
documents, as required, or whenever any witness so summoned refuses to
answer any question pertinent to the subject under inquiry before either
House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolu-
tion of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee or subcommittee of
either House of Congress, and the fact of such failure or failures is re-
ported to either House while Congress is in session or when Congress is
not in session, a statement of fact constituting such failure is reported to
and filed with the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House, it
shall be the duty of the said President of the Senate or Speaker of the
House, as the case may be, to certify, and he shall so certify, the state-
ment of facts aforesaid under the seal of the Senate or House, as the case
may be, to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be
to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action.
2 U.S.C. §§ 192-94 (1976).
45. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 143.
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mittee. From 1792 to 1942 only 108 contempt citations were issued
as a result of only 600 congressional investigations. 46
Both the frequency and the method of issuing citations changed
around 1945. The reason for the change was due in part to an in-
creased reliance on the judicial system.47 Once Congress decided
it would leave the determination of guilt or innocence to the judi-
cial branch, the issuance of a contempt citation became simply a
procedural practice. Indeed, Congress was no longer even bur-
dened with prosecuting the contempt action; this responsibility
had been turned over to the Justice Department.48 As a result, of
the 226 contempt citations presented to Congress between 1945
and 1957, few were discussed on the floor, fewer were debated,
and none were defeated.49
The procedures required for invoking Congress' inherent com-
mon law power of contempt are quite simple. The sanction is re-
quested by a subcommittee which introduces a resolution
directing the presiding officer of the chamber to. issue a warrant
for the arrest of the contemptuous witness. The Sergeant at
Arms is directed to bring the witness before the bar of the House
or Senate. Depending on the subsequent testimony of the wit-
ness, he is either placed in confinement, reprimanded by the pre-
siding officer, or simply discharged.0
The statutory contempt power is currently embodied in 2 U.S.C.
§§ 192-94.51 In addition to certain procedural safeguards, the stat-
utory power differs from the common law power in that it is in the
nature of a criminal proceeding. Should a committee wish to hold
46. Id. See generally R. GOLDFARB, supra note 26, at 196, and C. BECK, supra
note 26, at appendix.
47. The contempt citations generally fall into one of two classes: 1.) Those in-
volving affirmative acts by individuals, i.e., bribery or attempting to interfere with
the legislative process by some form of obstruction, and; 2.) Those involving nega-
tive acts, i.e., refusals by witnesses to do certain acts such as offer testimony or
the production of documents. See C. BECK, supra note 26, at 185; GUIDE TO CON-
GRESS, supra note 21, at 144.
48. This is provided for by the language of the statute itself. See supra note
44.
49. See C. BECK, supra, note 26, at 185.
50. GUIDE To CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 144. An argument could be
presented that such a determination by Congress is not reviewable by the courts.
Just as the courts have recognized the independent judicial sovereignty of Article
H courts for court martials, so too does the possibility of judicial sovereignty of Ar-
ticle I courts exist, thus making the congressional determination nonreviewable by
Article III courts. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
51. For the text of the statute see supra note 44.
a witness in contempt under this authority, it introduces a resolu-
tion to the parent body and upon a simple majority vote, the cita-
tion is referred to a U.S. Attorney for presentation to a grand
jury.5 2 The attractiveness of this method is obvious. It frees Con-
gress from the burden of sitting as prosecutor, judge, and jury and
allows it to continue with its current business. The executive
branch is left to prosecute the case and the judicial branch is left
to decide the merits of the citation. The statute simply delegates
powers held within Congress' inherent authority to the other
branches of government.
Before examining the role of the executive, a short examination
of three judicial decisions should help to bring into focus the
proper scope and use of the contempt power. The inquiry actu-
ally requires two examinations. One examination is required for
the common law inherent contempt power, and the other is neces-
sary for the statutory contempt power.
Congress continued to expand its use of the contempt power
until 1880.53 This trend was suddenly reversed in the case of Kil-
bourn v. Thompson. 54 Hallett Kilbourn was subpoenaed and sub-
sequently appeared before the House, but refused to answer
certain questions or to turn over requested documents. Kilbourn
was cited for contempt and subsequently incarcerated in the con-
gressional jail. Kilbourn invoked the jurisdiction of the Court by
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.5 5 A unanimous Court
granted Kilbourn his freedom, finding the acts of the Congress
wholly unauthorized.5 6
52. See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 144.
53. Beginning with the St. Clair Inquiry, Congress continued to increase the
number of its investigations. For example, there was the extensive work of the
Joint Committee on the Conduct of the [CivilI War as well as the flurry of 37 con-
gressional investigations surrounding Grant's eight years as President into accusa-
tions of maladministration. See J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF
ADMIISTRATION 253-55 (1964).
54. 103 U.S. 168 (1880). The decision arose from an investigation by the House
of Representatives into the bankruptcy of Jay Cooke & Co., which had as one of its
creditors the United States.
55. On April 12, 1876, the Speaker reported to the House that a writ of habeas
corpus had been served on the Sergeant at Arms commanding the production of
Kilbourn before the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. After considera-
ble debate over whether the courts had authority to command the relinquishment
of the custody over Kilbourn, a resolution was adopted permitting the transfer.
Following the court's determination that Congress lacked the power to impose
summary punishment against a witness, Kilbourn proceeded to sue the Sergeant
at Arms as well as others for assault and false imprisonment. See Moreland,
supra note 39, at 212-14.
56. 103 U.S. at 189-97. The Court refused to acknowledge any similarity be-
tween the contempt power of Congress and that of a court. The Court resolved
that the investigation was merely an investigation into the private life of Mr. Kil-
bourn and as such, Congress lacked any power to investigate "the private affairs of
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Writing for the Court, Justice Miller found that Congress lacked
the authority to punish individuals for their conduct, with the nar-
row exception of sanctions against its own members.57 Justice
Miller rejected both grounds upon which Congress claimed the
power to punish for contempt. First, the Court held that the con-
tempt power was not a means necessary to allow Congress to ade-
quately perform its kegislative duties. 58 Second, the Court
rejected the contention that it was a power which the Congress
inherited from Parliament.5 9 Expanding on this second point, the
Court noted that Parliament had been a body of both judicial and
legislative powers. The Court found that no such grant of judicial
power had been given to the Congress.
Justice Miller's conception of separation of powers is too sim-
plistic. The Constitution does not contain three neatly wrapped
parcels of power which are entirely divisible. Recognition of the
congressional contempt power would not defeat the notion of sep-
aration of powers, but would actually strengthen it by providing a
means for Congress to ensure its effective legislation and investi-
gation without relying on the judiciary in all instances.
The Court's opinion is also questionable on two other grounds.
First, the Court failed to recognize the nature of the contempt ci-
tation. The contempt action is one of the rare uses by Congress of
its own inherent contempt power. Such a power is of a different
nature than the utilization of the statutory contempt citation. Im-
prisonment is not requested from the courts, but is summarily im-
posed by the legislative branch. Accordingly, the proper scope of
the Court's review of the writ of habeas corpus should be limited
to the legality of the detention, rather than the guilt or innocence
of the prisoner.
Another problem was that the Court chose to express its own
the citizen." Id. at 190. Simply, Congress had acted beyond the scope of its consti-
tutionally delegated powers,
57. Id. The decision is significant in that it marked the first occasion where
the Court would refuse to uphold a congressional contempt citation, the result be-
ing the insertion of a degree of paranoia into any future contempt considerations
by Congress. Two other points were established. First, it established a precedent
for judicial review for a writ of habeas corpus stemming from a congressional con-
tempt citation. Second, while denying any general parliamentary type summary
contempt power, the Court implied in dictum that under limited constitutionally
authorized situations, Congress may indeed have some restricted contempt pow-
ers. See Moreland, supra nate 39, at 213-16.
58. 103 U.S. at 197.
59. Id. at 189.
personal hostilities towards the invocation of legislative investiga-
tions, rather than properly limiting the scope of its review to the
jurisdictional propriety of the confinement. It is unlikely that the
Kilbourn decision would stand today. The Court has come to
view legislative inquiries with less hostility and has subsequently
noted the validity of their purpose.60
It was not until 1927, in McGrain v. Daugherty, 61 that the
Supreme Court had an occasion to uphold the power of Congress
to punish a witness for contempt. This validation centered on
Congress' use of the statutory power of contempt, which required
the invocation of the judicial power prior to sentencing. The in-
quiries arose out of investigations into the Teapot Dome scan-
dal.62 The Court took a more deferential view of Congress'
authority to issue a contempt citation. The Court did not require
a specific piece of legislation authorizing the investigation. It was
enough that the inquiry involved the administration of the De-
partment of Justice-a proper area for congressional legislation.63
The Court noted, "We are of opinion that the power of inquiry-
with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxil-
iary to the legislative function."64
The Court recognized that the power of investigation was a nec-
essary counterpart to the power to legislate. Although recogniz-
ing the power, the Court premised its exercise upon the need for
legislation. Such a restriction ignores the role of Congress as a
body entrusted with overseeing the proper administration of the
executive branch, as well as its role as an information gatherer to
act on behalf of the public. If history had taught anything prior to
1927, it was that the investigatory functions of Congress were not
60. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929) (the Court reemphasized
its belief that it no longer viewed congressional inquiries with the hostile attitude
it had previously expressed in Kilbourn).
61. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
62. The Teapot Dome scandal centered around the activities leading up to gov-
ernmental leasing of naval oil reserves in the Elk Hills reserve in California and
the Teapot Dome reserve in Wyoming. President Harding had transferred juris-
diction of the reserves over to the Department of the Interior, headed by the Sec-
retary of the Interior Albert B. Fall. Mysteriously, shortly after the signing of
leases by private oil companies, Secretary Fall became quite wealthy. Congress
instituted a series of investigations which revealed that Fal had received bribes
amounting to over $400,000. The revelation led to the criminal conviction of Fall as
well as other investigations into the Harding administration. See Harris, supra
note 53, at 259; GuiDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 163.
63. Mr. Justice Van Devanter stated: "[The subject to be investigated was the
administration of the Department of Justice-whether its functions were being
properly discharged .... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could
be had and would be materially aided by the information which the investigation
was calculated to elicit." 273 U.S. at 177.
64. Id. at 174.
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limited to the preparation of legislation. Most major investiga-
tions, dating from the '3t. Clair inquiry on, were premised on the
need for congressional oversight, not congressional legislation.65
The final consideration relevant to the scope of the contempt
power is of more recent vintage. In Watkins v. United States, 66
the Court imposed restrictions on the congressional statutory
contempt power, not because of limits of power granted to the leg-
islative branch, but rather due to specific constitutional inhibi-
tions which applied to all branches of government. The decision
did not question the basis of the authority for congressional in-
vestigations or contempt citations. Rather it imposed certain con-
stitutionally mandated procedural requirements which Congress
was obligated to follow, thus preserving the congressional powers
of self-help and self-preservation.6 7
III. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES ArrORNEY GENERAL
A. Creation and History of the Office
The Office of the Attorney General 68 was established by Con-
65. For a summary of congressional investigations, see P. KURLAND, supra
note 9, at 27.
66. 354 U.S. 178 (1957). The Court determined that the charter of authority to
the committee had been too vague regarding the scope of the committee's investi-
gatory power. This left the witness unable to determine whether the propounded
questions were actually pertinent to the authorized investigation.
67. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Warren, stated:
It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress
in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative ac-
tion .... This, of course, assumes that the constitutional rights of wit-
nesses will be respected by the Congress as they are in a court of justice.
The Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all forms of govern-
mental action. Witnesses cannot be compelled to give evidence against
themselves. They cannot be subjected to unreasonable search and
seizure. Nor can the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, reli-
gion, or political belief and association be abridged.
354 U.S. at 187-88. The value of the self-help remedy is somewhat dubious if at-
tempted against a member of the executive branch. Unless the Sergeant at Arms
would deputize a militia, it would seem unlikely that he would be allowed past the
White House security. Even with an army of deputies, what would he do once
they arrived?
68. The Attorney General of the United States runs the largest law office
in the world but he has only one client, the government of the United
States. The basic function of the Department of Justice, of which the at-
torney general is the head, is to represent the interests of the United
States in the courts. The attorney general is the government's law en-
forcement officer.
Huston, History of the Office, of the Attorney Genera, in ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Huston].
gress in The Judiciary Act of 1789.69 The Act provided that the At-
torney General was to "prosecute and conduct all suits in the
Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned"
and to render opinions on questions of law to the President and
heads of the departments when so requested.7 0 Although respon-
sible to the President in the performance of his discretionary du-
ties, the grant of his power, as well as the ultimate performance of
his duties, are subject to congressional control.71
The Office of the Attorney General did not always have the
power and prestige that it possesses today. In fact, as originally
occupied, "the office could not have been smaller and scarcely
more poorly paid. [He] received $1,500 per year and had to pay
his own rent, pay his own stamps and stationery, and furnish his
own heat and light. He had no assistant."72 It was not until 30
years after the formation of the federal government that Congress
saw fit to provide the Attorney General with government office
space, a $1,000-a-year legal clerk, and a fund of up to $500 to pay
for such things as stationery, stamps, and a "boy to attend to me-
nial duties." 73
The first recipient of the office was Edmund Randolph. Al-
though aware of the general unattractiveness of the position,
President Washington was also familiar with human nature. He
enticed Randolph into accepting the position by pointing out that
the office would "confer pre-eminence" upon the individual and
therefore provide him with a "decided preference of professional
employment."7 4 Originally serving as de facto counsel for Con-
gress, 75 the Attorney General eventually became absorbed by the
executive branch, becoming the head of an executive department
69. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92.
70. Id. at 93.
71. Senator Sam J. Ervin stated his position on the power of Congress to regu-
late the functions of the Attorney General: "All powers of the Attorney General
and the Department of Justice flow from Acts of Congress. There can be little
doubt-in fact, no doubt at all-that what Congress gives, Congress can take
away." Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S.2803
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1979). The Supreme Court in McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135 (1926), seemed to concur with such an evaluation, stating that "the
functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the Attorney
General, and the duties of his assistants are all subject to regulation by congres-
sional legislation .... " Id. at 178. It seems only natural that a creature of statute
should be subject to modification or even elimination by statute.
72. Huston, supra note 68, at 1-2.
73. Id. at 5. The office was only a part time job until 1853 when Caleb Cushing
took office at a salary of $8,000.
74. Huston, supra note 68, at 5-6.
75. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 8 (1967); see infra notes 79-81 and ac-
companying text.
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in 1870.76 With the rise of the imperial presidency, the division
between the Attorney General's role as the chief legal officer of
the United States and as adviser to the executive has become
more uncertain.
B. Conflict of Loyalty: The Attorney General's Three Masters
The confusion surrounding the role of the Attorney General is
due in part to the fact that the office has a built-in schizophrenic
nature. The office is required to serve not one, but "three masters
- the President, the Congress, and the Judiciary."77 In addition,
the loyalty of the office is divided into two other segments - le-
gal and political. Edward Bates, the Attorney General under
President; Lincoln, once stated his belief as to the loyalty of the
office: "The office of Attorney General is not properly political,
but strictly legal, and it is my duty, above all other ministers of
State to uphold the law and to resist all encroachments, from
whatever quarter, or mere will and power."7 8
The Judiciary Act of 178979 did not define the role to be played
by the Attorney General toward the Congress. Yet, from the date
of its creation, the office was seen by Congress as a valuable
source for legal opinions on the propriety and constitutionality of
proposed legislation.80 For the next 20 years, Congress increas-
ingly relied upon the advice of the Attorney General, although not
always following it. However, the relationship rapidly became a
burden on the Attorney General's office and in 1819, Attorney
General William Wirt put an end to the practice of providing such
advice to Congress. 'In a memorandum to President James
Monroe, Wirt stated that, as he perceived the role of his office, the
opinions which had been generated for the Congress had been
simply a matter of courtesy. Accordingly, Wirt, apparently being
less courteous than his predecessors, felt that if the practice was
76. Id. at 35-36. The Attorney General actually became an integral part of the
executive branch much earlier. Dating back to the first Attorney General, Ed-
mond Randolph, the occupant of that office has often attended cabinet meetings.
Randolph was present at the first cabinet meeting called by a President.
77. Huston, supra note 68, at 3.
78. Bates was one of the few Attorney Generals to successfully resist political
affiliation with the President. Quoted in Miller, The Attorney General as the Presi-
dent's Lawyer, in ROLES OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 41, 51
(1968).
79. See supra note 69.
80. Huston, supra note 68, at 6-7.
to continue, the Congress should enact the appropriate
legislation.8 1
Congress has yet to enact legislation which would more care-
fully define the role of the Attorney General. Rather, if Congress
desires the opinion of the Attorney General, the modern practice
is simply to request his testimony as to the propriety of pending
legislation.8 2 As a result of the actions of Attorney General Wirt,
Congress has increasingly relied on the advice of internal counsel
as an aid in drafting legislation. Today, congressional committees
of the House and the Senate each have an office of legislative
counsel staffed by their attorneys, a practice which further sepa-
rates the interests of the Congress and the Attorney General and
concurrently reinforces the loyalty and dependence of the latter
upon the President.8 3
Neither the statutes nor the Constitution define the role of the
Attorney General in relation to the judicial branch. The only gui-
dance from the Judiciary Act of 1789 is that he should be "a meet
person, learned in the law, to act as attorney general for the
United States."8 4 Furthermore, the Attorney General is given the
responsibility to "prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme
Court in which the United States shall be concerned." 85
In an effort to more carefully define this judicial role, Congress
in 1870 provided for the office of another individual "learned in
the law," the Solicitor General. 86 Although acting under the At-
torney General, the Solicitor General has the inherent ability to
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on
S.2803 and S.2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judi-
ciary Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-529 (1974).
84. See supra note 69, at 93.
85. Id. The office was not entirely without precedent. A similar office evolved
in England during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. During this period,
kings began to increasingly conduct legal matters through one attorney with a
broad charter rather than numerous attorneys whose powers were confined to a
particular court, region or matter. By the end of the sixteenth century, such attor-
neys became the primary representative of the crown in the courts. G.W. HoLDs-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 458-61 (1924 ed.); see also Cooley, Predecessors
of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney General in England and the Ameri-
can Colonies, 2 AM. J. HiST. 304, 309 (1958).
86. The office of the Solicitor General was created by the Judiciary Act of 1870,
ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162. The Solicitor General, as the government's head of litiga-
tion, enjoys a wide breadth of power. He has the power to deny government agen-
cies and departments access to the Supreme Court, to decide whether to appeal
cases unsuccessfully litigated by the Justice Department, and to act as amicus cu-
riae in the appellate courts. For a discussion on the role of the Solicitor General
see Note, The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental Conflict, 76 MICH. L. REV.
324 (1977). For the current statutory provisions defining the role of the Solicitor
General, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 505, 517, 518 (1976).
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maintain a more neutral stance towards the executive than does
the Attorney General.87 The more detached neutrality may be
due in part to what Archibald Cox termed as a "sense of loyalty to
the Court" which may temper the advocate's zealousness. 88 As
noted by former Attorney General Biddle, "[tJhe Solicitor Gen-
eral has no master to serve except his country."89
The Solicitor General is not charged with advising the Presi-
dent. Quite the opposite, the Solicitor General has often been de-
scribed as an advocate entrusted with protecting the people's
interest in upholding the Constitution.90 He fulfills his role by
participating as an amicus curie on behalf of the interests of the
United States.91 His role as amicus curie allows him a degree of
autonomy free from the politicalization of the executive branch.
Conversely, the Attorney General, in his capacity as adviser to
the President, tends to be engulfed in the politicalization of the
executive branch. As such, the Attorney General's inability to act
in a politically neutral fashion, free from the influence of the exec-
utive, casts further doubt upon his ability to act on behalf of the
public.
The executive is the third master served by the Attorney Gen-
eral. In his capacity as a cabinet officer, by necessity he has a
87. This is due in part simply because he is one more step politically removed
from the President. Another source of his autonomy stems from his special rela-
tionship as amicus curiae with the courts. See Note, supra note 86, at 327-28. De-
spite the degree of autonomy, on only one reported occasion has the Solicitor
General defied the executive branch, and his refusal simply amounted to a refusal
to argue for the government. See Lewis, Our Extraordinary Solicitor General, THE
REPORTER 27, 30-31 (May 5, 1955) (regarding the refusal of the Solicitor General to
appear in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955)). The degree of self-autonomy
granted the Solicitor General has created some interesting situations. Not only is
he the only party who may argue for a governmental agency in the Supreme
Court, but he is also an amicus curiae to the Court. This dual loyalty can create a
lack of effective representation for the particular governmental agency. For exam-
ple, in Dirks. v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983), the Solicitor General actually opposed
his own brief in a closing footnote. At the conclusion of a fairly scant brief filed
with the Court on behalf of the SEC, the Solicitor General included a footnote
stating his belief that the defendant had been improperly convicted and urged the
Court to disregard, in effect, his brief, and reverse the conviction. See Respon-
dent's Brief in Opposition at 17-18, Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
88. Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court, 44 CHL B. REC. 221, 222 (1963).
89. F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 98 (1962).
90. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 88, at 223; Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government:
The Work of the Solicitor General's Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229 (1955).
91. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
close and ongoing relationship with the President. 92 In legal the-
ory, there is a direct avenue of authority running from the Presi-
dent to the Attorney General in carrying out the President's
duties "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed."93 View-
ing the role of the Attorney General as a conduit of the Presi-
dent's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws of the
United States, it is not difficult to understand why the Attorney
General feels his loyalty must ultimately rest with the executive.
The loyalty of the Attorney General to the President, however,
is based upon two foundations - political and legal. As stated by
Professor Arthur S. Miller, "[tJhe relationship of the attorney
general to the President is made more difficult because the attor-
ney general is a political officer charged with legal duties." 94
These conflicting loyalties often force the Attorney General to
choose between his legal and political affiliations. 95
The tension between the political and legal duties of the Attor-
ney General is further exasperated by the fact that he is an indi-
vidual who serves at the pleasure of the President. 96 In
constitutional theory, although perhaps not in reality, his obliga-
tions are clear. As an individual entrusted with the faithful exe-
cution of the law, his ultimate duty lies with the Constitution and
92. Since the appointment of the first Attorney General, tile President has re-
lied upon his legal advice. The continuation of his employment also depends on a
close relationship with the President due to the fact that he may be dismissed by
the President at any time. Justice Sutherland observed that, "[Ilt is quite evident
that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another cannot be de-
pended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's will."
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 605, 622 (1935).
93. Miller, The Attorney General as the President's Lawyer, in ROLES OF THE
ATrORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 41, 45 (1968).
94. Id. at 51.
95. Miller points out the clash of opposing loyalties through the use of two
quotations:
Attorney General Edward Bates (appointed by President Lincoln):
The office I hold is not properly political, but strictly legal; and it is my
duty, above all other ministers of State to uphold the Law and to resist all
encroachment, from whatever quarter, of mere will and power. [emphasis
added].
Reportedly President Andrew Jackson took the opposite view of the at-
torney general during the controversy over the national bank in the 1830's.
Senator George H. Williams, who was later to become attorney general
himself, said many years later-
Consulting with his Attorney General, he [President Jackson] found that
some doubts were entertained by that officer as to the existence of any
law authorizing the Executive to do that act [designating certain banks to
be depositories of U.S. funds], whereupon Old Hickory said to him, "Sir,
you must find a law authorizing the act or I will appoint an Attorney Gen-
eral who will."
Id.
96. See supra note 92.
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not with the President97 As noted by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall,
this is a "government of laws, and not of men."98
C. Prosecutorial Discretion
1. Overview
Prosecutor and discretion: each has a well understood meaning.
Yet when placed side by side they seem to take on an almost
mystic significance. They create the power to sit as accuser,
judge, and jury. The argument is that the doctrine of
prosecutorial discretion is an inherent power of the executive, a
power which is transferred to the Attorney General.99 The argu-
ment also musters support from the concept of separation of
powers.1OO
However, to state that the Attorney General has an unlimited
inherent right to determine whether to prosecute in all matters is
to apply too simplistic an answer to a complex question. Two ad-
ditional divisions of the inquiry are required. First, a determina-
tion must be made as to whether the role to be exercised is of
constitutional or congressional origin.10 1 If the power is one of
97. As an officer appointed to uphold the Constitution as well as his allegiance
to the Constitution through his role as an attorney, there can be no doubt that his
ultimate loyalty must lie with the Constitution.
98. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
99. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v.
Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
100. The Court has declared that "[a] lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a
breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Con-
stitution entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.'" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (citation omitted). The argument,
however, assumes the "faithful" execution by the executive. Should the executive
fail to faithfully execute the laws, some remedy must be available to Congress to
achieve enforcement of its statutes.
Practical realities also demand that the Attorney General be given some flex-
ibility in his prosecutions, as do the constraints of time and money. Unable to
prosecute all violations, the executive must be allowed the ability to design some
enforcement hierarchy. This discretion, however, does not allow for the enforce-
ment only of those statutes the executive feels like enforcing. Rather, it only al-
lows for a modification of how to enforce certain statutes, not what statutes to
enforce. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) ("constitutional duty [of the President to see to the faithful execution of
the laws] does not permit the President [and his Attorney General] to refrain
from executing laws duly enacted by the Congress as those laws are construed by
the judiciary").
101. Where the role is defined by statute, the determination is relatively simple
if the statute specifies the duties to be executed, provided, of course, that they are
not inconsistent with the Constitution. A role of constitutional origin is more diffi-
constitutional nativity, an argument could be advanced that, in
acting pursuant to the President's constitutional authority, the At-
torney General is himself cloaked with a shroud of immunity
from congressional control. The argument has a separation of
powers flavor and can be traced back to Marbury v. Madison. 10 2
On the other hand, if the power originates solely from Congress,
the Attorney General is acting principally as an agent of Congress
and is, therefore, required to follow congressional instructions.
Accordingly, any discretion exercised by the Attorney General
would exist only through the grace of Congress.1 03
Further clarification of any discretionary powers belonging to
the Attorney General requires an understanding of the difference
between ministerial and discretionary duties. A ministerial duty
is one where nothing is left to discretion but rather a simple and
definite duty is imposed.104 Conversely, a discretionary duty is
one in which the manner and extent of execution is left to the in-
dividual's own judgment.l0 5 Therefore, prior to determining the
validity of a doctrine of prosecutorial discretion, an examination
should be made as to the nature of the alleged power.
2. Search for Common Law Roles
In searching for another possible source to define the Attorney
General's role, one commentator has suggested looking to the
common law as a means of finding direction. 0 6 An examination
of common law powers should begin with an inquiry into the pow-
cult to define. In view of the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, the Presi-
dent's duty to execute the laws may be arguably to execute only those laws which
are constitutional. A refusal to execute a law believed to be unconstitutional by
the executive may be found to be consistent with the faithful execution clause.
Taken a step further, as a constitutional officer, the President may even be obli-
gated to challenge a law he finds unconstitutional. See supra note 86, at 353 n.141.
102. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803):
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court.
Id. at 170.
103. Compare United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274 (1911), with Powell v. Kat-
zenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966), to get a feel-
ing as to the differing judicial viewpoints on the discretionary power.
104. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 899 (5th ed. 1979). See Wilbur v. United
States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1930): "Where the duty in a particular
situation is so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and equivalent to a posi-
tive command it is regarded as being so far ministerial that its performance may
be compelled by mandamus, unless there be provision or implication to the con-
trary." Id.
105. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 419 (5th ed. 1979).
106. Note, supra note 86, at 334-46.
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ers of state attorneys general. In contrast to the United States At-
torney General, state attorneys general enjoy a wide latitude of
independent authority to support or contest governmental actions
on behalf of the public, either through an electoral mandate by
the public or through a broad statutory or constitutional grant of
authority to act on behalf of the public interest 0 7
The common law power has been found to provide some state
attorney generals with a paramount duty to act on behalf of the
public, independent of, and even in opposition to, their duties to
advocate on behalf of the state government.108 This power, or
duty as the case may be, is thought to be derived in part from the
connections to the English Attorney General, an individual re-
sponsible for the interests of the sovereign crown in the courts. 0 9
Accordingly, the American state attorney general, with his corre-
sponding common law power, is granted authority to represent
the interests of the sovereign public.
In contrast to state attorneys general, the United States Attor-
ney General completely lacks his own constituency." 0 He is a
creature of statute. He derives no independent authority from the
common law or from any power to speak for the public. This does
not mean that the Attorney General has no right to contest gov-
ernment actions or to represent the interests of the public; but it
should be recognized that the independent right to speak for the
public is not an inherent power within the office. The Attorney
General serves at the pleasure of the President and his duties
may be regulated by Congress."' Thus, any assertions on behalf
of the public interest by the Attorney General result from acqui-
escence on the part of Congress and the President, and should not
be viewed as a positive grant of power to act in the public
107. See NATIONAL AssocIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, REPORT ON THE OF-
FICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 43-57 (1971) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]; see also
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AITORNEYS GENERAL, COMMON LAW POwERS OF STATE
ATrORNEYS GENERAL (1975). As of 1971, 42 states elected attorneys general, six
were selected by the governor, one by the legislature, and one by the state
supreme court. REPORT, supra note 107, at 62-63.
108. See Commonwealth ex reL. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1974);
State ex reL. Dunbar v. State Bd. of Equal., 140 Wash. 433, 249 P. 996 (1926).
109. See 0. HAMMONDs, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN THE AMERICAN COLONIEs 3
(Anglo-American Legal Hist. Series, ser. 1, No. 2, 1939); for a brief summary of the
English Attorney General see supra note 85.
110. Cf. Position Paper of Att'y Gen. Louis J. Lefkowitz, presented to N.Y. Con-
stitutional Convention, Comm. on the Executive Branch, Albany, N.Y. (June 1,
1967). See Note, supra note 86, at 345 n.100.
111. See supra notes 71, 92 and accompanying text.
interest.112
3. The Commands of 2 U.S.C. § 194
The commands of section 194 are quite simple. Once certified
by the House or Senate, the contempt citation's shall be referred
"to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be
to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action.""l3
The Attorney General was to play a minor role, that of a mere
messenger, but, he was given a role. In Ex Parte Frankfeld, 114 the
court doubted the role of the Attorney General:
It seems quite apparent that Congress intended to leave no measure of
discretion to either the Speaker of the House or the President of the Sen-
ate ... but made the certification of facts to the district attorney a
mandatory proceeding, and it left no discretion with the district attorney as
to what he should do about it. He is required under the language of the
statute, to submit the facts to the grand jury. 115
The conclusion seems obvious; Congress is to enact the laws. The
executive, and therefore the Attorney General, is to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."116 Acting as an agent of
Congress, executive officials are not given discretion to ignore
statutes which prescribe required conduct. The required activity
is a ministerial, not a discretionary power.
The exercise of discretion by an individual cannot exceed the
scope of the power or right granted to him. To grant absolute dis-
cretion to the executive branch in its prosecution or non-prosecu-
tion of all laws would effectively cancel the lawmaking powers of
Congress. 1 7 Under such an analysis, the executive, and not Con-
112. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274 (1911) (imposing a duty on
the District Attorney to commence prosecution without delay). Cf. Powell v. Kat-
zenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966) (question of
whether and when to prosecute was within discretion of United States Attorney
General).
113. See supra note 44 (emphasis added). It is the function of the United
States Attorneys to exercise the traditional functions of the Attorney General at
the district level. The United States Attorney General acts primarily as an admin-
istrator, overseeing the operations of the Department of Justice.
114. 32 F. Supp. 915 (D.D.C. 1940).
115. Id. at 916 (emphasis added).
116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The Supreme Court has also recognized the author-
ity of Congress to require certain acts from the Justice Department. See McGrain
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 178 (1927) ("the functions of the Department of Justice,
the powers and duties of the Attorney General and the duties of his assistants, are
all subject to regulation by congressional legislation").
117. Justice Jackson expressed a similar concern in the famous Steel Seizure
Case, stating his concern over an alleged inherent power in the Executive to act
without control by Congress or the courts: "Such power either has no beginning
or it has no end. If it exists, it need submit to no legal restraint. I am not alarmed
that it would plunge us straightway into dictatorship, but it is at least a step in
that wrong direction." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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gress, would become the lawmaker because he alone would dic-
tate how, when, where, and why to prosecute. Such an
interpretation violates the separation of powers doctrine. How-
ever, accepting the premise that the executive has some unde-
fined scope of prosecutorial discretion, the definition of the exact
nature of that power should depend on the particular application.
It must be recognized that prosecutorial discretion is not an abso-
lute power under all circumstances.118
Assuming that an executive power of prosecutorial discretion
exists, the most logical method of determining the proper scope of
that power would be to examine the statute defining the particu-
lar offense. Should the statute allow for discretion, or fail to spec-
ify a duty to prosecute, arguably the executive would have a
degree of discretion on whether or not to prosecute in a specific
instance. The power would stem either from an inherent execu-
tive right or from the grace of Congress. 119 In either case, should
the statute require affirmative prosecution by the executive, the
executive would have to comply, assuming, of course, that such
conduct is not found unconstitutional by the courts. An under-
standing that discretion can only be allowed to the degree it is
permitted mandates the need for statutory interpretation to deter-
mine statutory rights.120
The duties of the executive under section 194 are mandatory.12'
The statute calls on the executive, as the enforcer of the laws, to
act as a necessary conduit between the legislative and judicial
branches. The required action involves neither independent judg-
ment of guilt or innocence nor a great expenditure of time, effort,
or expense. It simply requires the presentation of the contempt
citation to a grand jury.122 The allegation that discretion exists is
118. The argument assumes that some degree of discretion is inherent in all
prosecutors. However, an equally strong suggestion is that the only possible
source of discretion stems from congressional statutes. The executive is not
granted any degree of prosecutorial discretion by the Constitution, only those cer-
tain delegated powers of Article II are conferred upon him. Thus, the only remain-
ing source would be his grant of authority by statute. Accordingly, only the
statute could provide any degree of discretion, if at all.
119. Several courts have chosen to examine the particular statute as an indica-
tor of whether Congress intended to allow the executive discretion on whether to
prosecute. See Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Moses v.
Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963).
120. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 44. The United States Attorney is imposed with a duty-"to
bring the matter before the grand jury for its action." Id.
122. Id.
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without legal or logical foundation.
IV. THE PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
A. Reliance on Executive Privilege
1. The Concept
Executive privilege is a nebulous concept. It consists of the al-
leged authority of the executive to deny access to information in
its possession to Congress or the judiciary, even when those
branches have affirmatively requested or commanded that the ex-
ecutive produce such information.123 When examined more care-
fully, the privilege consists of at least five individual components.
Each component carries with it a separate justification for its pur-
pose. Professor Kurland lists these components as the ability to
withhold:124 (1) the content of confidential communications be-
tween the President and his advisers in order to protect the abil-
ity of the executive to ensure candid and honest discussions as a
necessary protection to the proper functioning of his office; (2)
military secrets necessary to protect the defense of the nation; (3)
diplomatically sensitive data necessary to maintain sensitive in-
ternational agreements. (4) data concerning individuals who are
or have been the subject of civil or criminal investigations; and
(5) information requested by Congress where it would be admin-
istratively cumbersome to supply the requested information.
An inquiry into the integrity of the privilege should focus on the
nature of the invocation, rather than the individual who has in-
voked the privilege. 2 5 The fact that a communication stems from
the lips or pen of the President should not grant it some mystical
protection impenetrable by Congress or the courts. Rather, the
nature of the communication should be determinative of the de-
gree of protection that is warranted. The application of the analy-
sis of the former would extend the privilege to a conversation
between the President and a White House gardener concerning
an upcoming World Series, while possibly denying the privilege to
discussions between the White House Counsel and the Secretary
of State concerning sensitive international negotiations. Argua-
123. P. KuRLAND, supra note 9, at 36.
124. Id. at 36-37.
125. The danger of absolute discretion inherent within the executive is obvious
and it runs counter to the separation of powers doctrine. See supra note 30 (com-
ments of Justice Jackson); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2709(1982)
(White, J., dissenting), where Justice White objects to the application by the ma-
jority of an absolute immunity to the office of the presidency, as opposed to partic-
ularftunctions of the president. The Supreme Court has, on occasion, adopted an
approach of examining and balancing the competing interests. See United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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bly, the scope of this suggested analysis is too narrow. 126 How-
ever, a privilege which ,depends upon the source of the executive
communication would possibly encompass every employee within
the executive branch as being a potential source of privileged
communications. A more defensible position would be to extend
the privilege, if at all, only to high level aides in the administra-
tion, then to further analyze the situation whether the nature of
the communication warrants the invocation of the privilege by the
President.
Ultimately the propriety of the invocation of the privilege must
turn on the nature of the particular communication. An examina-
tion of the nature of the claim will not by any means conclusively
determine the validity of the privilege, but it should aid in the de-
termination as to the propriety of the invocation by serving as an
initial presumption.127
First, the power to reject a judicial subpoena rests upon a weak
foundation.128 Such an action would constitute direct defiance by
the executive branch of an order from the judicial branch. Since
our country is a nation of laws and not men and the Supreme
Court is to act as the final arbiter as to the law, it would seem un-
tenable to assert that the executive should have such an unlim-
ited power.129
In dealing with situations involving military secrets or sensitive
data, it must be recognized that the privilege relates to the Presi-
dent's power over foreign affairs. The President has consistently
been looked to as the individual entrusted to the management of
foreign affairs. Accordingly, when the privilege is invoked on this
126. An expansive argument would be that certain individuals' communica-
tions, whatever their actual content, must be regarded as confidential. See P. KUR-
LAND, supra note 9, at 37. There is, however, no basis in either history or logic for
such an extension.
127. An attempt to examine the narrow basis as to each justification is prefera-
ble to an unlimited, undefined, inherent power. See Justice Jackson's three cate-
gories of presidential power, infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
128. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, where the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Burger, stated: "It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate
those guarantees [the rights of the accused according to the fifth and sixth amend-
ments] and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evi-
dence be produced." Id. at '711. The Court also spoke of the President's claim of
an inherent right to withhold. information: "No case of the Court, however, has ex-
tended this high degree of deference to a President's generalized interest in confi-
dentiality." Id.
129. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (the Court imposed a
"duty" upon itself to determine, as the final arbiter, the meaning of the law).
basis, the greatest possible deference should be granted.130
Perhaps the most interesting use of executive privilege involves
the claims of the sensitivity of ongoing civil and criminal prosecu-
tions. 13 1 Let us set the stage. Congress, and only Congress, is en-
trusted with the duty to make the laws.' 32 The executive is
entrusted with the responsibility to see that the laws be faithfully
executed. Viewed in this limited capacity, the executive is essen-
tially an agent acting on behalf of Congress. The executive
merely executes Congress' will. If the disclosure of data concern-
ing ongoing investigations to Congress might in some way inter-
fere with the prosecutions of those individuals, this is of no
concern to the executive. If Congress chooses to foolishly divulge
sensitive materials, this is Congress' choice. They have the right
to make the mistake.
The executive, as an agent of the legislature, should have no
right to refuse the commands of his principal regarding such dis-
closure. As so eloquently stated by Justice Black, "[the Foun-
ders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the
Congress alone in both good and bad times.' 33 Correct or incor-
rect, the decision is that of the lawmaker.
Finally, the privilege may be invoked on the grounds that it
would be administratively cumbersome.134 Such an invocation
generally receives little sympathy. If the burden interferes with
an area of exclusive executive concern, judicial resolution may be
appropriate as to whether the request for information has been so
burdensome that it effectively interferes with the proper function-
ing of the executive branch. On the other hand, where the re-
quested information concerns an area primarily under the control
of Congress, which is funded by Congress, the propriety of the in-
130. The Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the special role of the Pres-
ident in foreign affairs. For example, see Justice Sutherland's broad reading of the
President's foreign affairs power in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936). It is the President alone who has the power to speak for the
nation. Although he makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate,
only the President is the negotiator. The Congress is powerless to invade his
power. Id. at 319. See also Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103 (1948) (relying on the President's role as Commander-in-Chief, the Court
found that certain information received by his intelligence networks were meant
only for the President, and not fit for publication to the world); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (note Justice Harlan's dissent recognizing
the exclusive role of the President in foreign affairs).
131. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
132. See The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579 (the President's seizure of steel
plants was held invalid without statutory authority to use seizure as a remedy
against labor unrest).
133. Id. at 589.
134. See infra note 171 (Reagan administration basing a refusal to turn over
documents in part on grounds of administrative inconvenience).
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vocation must be doubted because any expense incurred by the
investigation is ultimately funded by Congress.
2. Executive Privilege and Watergate
Watergate did not create the distortions inherent in the concept
of executive privilege, but it did elevate the political abuses of
that doctrine to a new standard.135 President Nixon was deter-
mined to oppose perceived incursions upon executive privilege by
the legislature and the judiciary-both of which were co-equal
branches with the executive branch. In one instance he was de-
nying Congress access to information.l3 6 Additionally, in what
proved to be the decisive conflict, he also chose to confront the ju-
dicial branch by refusing to permit information to be revealed in a
grand jury proceeding. Nixon stated his beliefs in a letter to Sen-
ator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., the Chairman of the Senate Watergate
Committee:
No President could function if the private papers of his office, prepared by
his personal staff, were open to public scrutiny .... Formulation of
sound public policy requires that the President and his personal staff be
able to communicate among themselves in complete candor .... If I were
to testify before the committee irreparable damage would be done to the
constitutional principle of separation of powers.
This dogmatic aproach by Nixon made compromise difficult, if not
impossible, thus providing the setting for an historic constitu-
tional controversy.
The Supreme Court was to strike a fatal blow to the President's
position by unanimously ordering Nixon to turn over the subpoe-
naed White House tapes. 38 The decision was significant for three
reasons. First, reaffirming its 1803 decision of Marbury v.
Madison, 139 the Court held that the judicial branch had the
power to act as the final arbiter of actions by the other two
branches. This concept, dating back to Marbury, has allowed the
135. The Watergate era has been extensively written on. For a few examples,
see R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (1974); GuIDE TO CONGRESS, WATERGATE:
CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS (1975); A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
(1973).
136. Nixon had refused to appear before a Senate committee or hand over re-
quested Presidential papers. See J. HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE 189 (1975).
137. See Letter from President Nixon to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (July 6,1973),
reprinted in part in GuiDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 158.
138. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974). They contained revela-
tions that the President himself had participated in the cover-up of the break-in of
the Democratic Headquarters at the Watergate complex. Id.
139. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Court to effectively exercise its constitutional authority with the
scheme of checks and balances, as established by the constitu-
tional trinity.
Second, the Court rejected Nixon's claim of an absolute execu-
tive privilege. "[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers,
nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications,
without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circum-
stances." 140 The Court refused to recognize any significant degree
of deference to "a President's generalized interest in confidential-
ity."141 Rather, the Court chose to adopt a balancing approach by
examining the nature of the privilege weighed against the needs
for fair administration of the criminal justice system. The Court
found that, under the circumstances presented, the presidential
privilege would have to give way.142
Although Nixon lost the battle, the Presidency may have won
the war. The Court did recognize that executive privilege was not
a mere myth, but was in fact a reality. "The privilege is funda-
mental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in
the separation of powers under the Constitution." 43 Unfortu-
nately, this broad dictum does not aid in an understanding of the
scope of the privilege.
The Court's decision is also significant in regard to a determina-
tion which the Court expressly refused to make. The Supreme
Court was faced with a confrontation on two fronts - the execu-
tive vis-a-vis the Congress and the judiciary. Yet the decision
turned solely upon the resolution of the confrontation concerning
the latter. Specifically, the Court noted:
We are not here concerned with the balance between the President's gen-
eralized interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in
civil litigation, nor with that between the confidentiality interest and con-
gressional demands for information, nor with the President's interest in
preserving state secrets. We address only the conflict between the Presi-
dent's assertion of a generalized privilege of confidentiality and the consti-
140. 418 U.S. at 706.
141. Id. at 711.
142. Id. at 711-13.
143. Id. at 708. The Court continued: "Freedom of communication [is] vital to
[the] fulfillment of the aims of wholesome relationships .... [G]overnment...
needs open but protected channels for the kind of plain talk that is essential to the
quality of its functioning." Id. at 708 n.17 (quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 325 (D.D.C. 1966)). See also THE FEDERALIST, No. 64
(Jay) (S. Mittell ed. 1930).
It is quite possible that the reason that Nixon was unsuccessful was simply a
lack of clearly stating any definite grounds for the invocation of the privilege. Had
he described the nature of the invocation with any justifiable specificity, history
may have been written differently. The main tenor of the Court's decision spoke
only of the rejection of such a generalized invocation. 418 U.S. at 711-12.
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tutional need for relevant evidence in criminal trials.
1 44
This disclaimer is recognition by the Court that executive privi-
lege must depend upon the nature of the invocation.1 45 The dis-
claimer might also suggest a higher degree of scrutiny by the
Court when information is refused to the Congress. However,
whatever importance one may attempt to attribute to this limiting
language, it must be balanced against the Supreme Court's broad
dictum relating to the constitutional importance of what it called
"the confidentiality of Presidential communications."146
V. THE CONFRONTATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE
BRANCHES
A. The Nature of Congressional Legislation v. Executive
Privilege
The power of the legislature to conduct widespread investiga-
tions dates back to the colonial legislatures and the British Parlia-
ment.14 7 There is no evidence from the Constitutional Convention
that the President was intended to be shielded from this inquiry.
Clearly, the first Congress was not reluctant in demanding infor-
mation from President Washington concerning the St. Clair in-
quiry. 4 8 There exists no sound reason to grant an implied
immunity to the individual entrusted with seeing that the laws be
"faithfully executed" firom the branch whose laws he is suppos-
edly "faithfully" executing. In the Constitution, the legislative
power is given to the Legislative branch and the enforcement to
the executive branch.14:9
144. 418 U.S. at 712 n.19 (emphasis added).
145. Viewed in this regard, perhaps Raoul Berger was correct in his assertion
that the doctrine of executive privilege is a myth:
"Executive privilege" - the President's claim of constitutional authority
to withhold information from Congress - is a myth. Unlike most myths,
the origins of which are lost in the mists of antiquity, "executive privilege"
is a product of the nineteenth century, fashioned by a succession of presi-
dents who created "precedents" to suit the occasion. The very words "ex-
ecutive privilege" were conjoined only yesterday, in 1958.
R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 1 (1974). Berger discussed the right of the exec-
utive to withhold information from Congress, while the Supreme Court has only
recognized the power of the President to withhold information from the judicial
branch. Thus, both may be in agreement.
146. 418 U.S. at 706; see generally 418 U.S. at 705-12.
147. See supra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
149. The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 587. The power is the ability to create
The creation of the Presidency, on the other hand, was unique.
The President was unlike anything existing in the Parliamentary
system.150 In contrast to Congress, the President was not granted
all powers necessary and proper to carry out his respective du-
ties. Rather, the executive was given only certain enumerated
powers which were even further limited by the legislature. Ac-
cording to the Constitution, "treaties and certain appointments
required Senate consent, and Congress was empowered to over-
ride the President's veto, thus being made the final arbiter of
what laws are necessary."151 As pointed out by Chief Justice Ta-
ney, the framers carefully chose to withhold from the executive
branch "many of the powers belonging to the executive branch of
the English government... and conferred (and that in clear and
specific terms) those powers only which were deemed
essential .... "152
It is the President, and not Congress, who has a duty "from
time to time to give to the Congress Information of the State of
the Union."15 3 This duty has often been construed to only require
the delivery of an annual Presidential State of the Union ad-
dress.I5 4 Justice Story chose to read the requirement in a more
realistic fashion: The President
must possess more extensive sources of information, as well in regard to
domestic as foreign affairs, than can belong to Congress. The true work-
ings of the laws. . . are more readily seen, and more constantly under the
view of the executive .... There is great wisdom, therefore, . . . in re-
quiring the President to lay before Congress all facts and information
which may assist their deliberations. 1 5 5
Furthermore, such an interpretation is more consistent with
Congress' traditionally viewed function as the grand inquest of
the nation. 56 It is beyond question that Congress has the power
to investigate the conduct of the executive. Any assertion that
the executive has the power to unilaterally execute uncontrolled
law; without the law, there is, by necessity, no corresponding duty to enforce the
law. It is the creation of the law which brings to life the authority to enforce it.
Therefore, the President's powers to enforce the laws are completely dependent
upon Congress' power as lawmaker. See 343 U.S. at 579.
150. He was to be neither king nor puppet. Yet without precedent, no one
could be certain what he would become. The founding fathers "were determined
to fashion for themselves a Presidency that would be strong but still limited." A.
SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
151. Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 UCLA L. REV.
1044, 1075 (1965).
152. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
153. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
154. Berger, supra note 151, at 1077. Thus imposing a duty to furnish informa-
tion which the Grand Inquest was historically authorized to require. Id.
155. 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 367
(4th ed. 1873).
156. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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discretion to refuse information to Congress, therefore, is both
logically and constitutionally unfounded. The more reasonable
interpretation would support the obligation of the executive to
furnish all information necessary and proper to the Congress to
aid in the performance of congressional duties. 5 7
As a final prelude to an examination into the scope of executive
authority, the writings of Justice Jackson may be of assistance.
The proper inquiry into separation of powers has few guideposts.
Rather than examining the problem as a nebulous, totally unde-
fined concept, Justice Jackson sought to delineate specific areas
of conflict which might possibly arise when searching for the
proper scope of the executive's power. Justice Jackson believed
that presidential powers are not fixed, but rather, fluctuate, "de-
pending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of [the]
Congress."158 Accordingly, an examination as to the nature of the
executive power was believed to more precisely define the scope
of that power. Three categories were possible, each carrying with
it a certain presumption:
1. "When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Con-
gress can delegate." 5 9 Any actions pursuant to such authoriza-
tion can fairly be said to constitute the action of the United States
and shall therefore be accorded the strongest presumptions of va-
lidity and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.
2. "When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its dis-
tribution is uncertain."13 O In such areas, congressional action or
lack of action may tend to invite efforts of independent presiden-
tial power. In these situations, "any actual test of power is likely
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary im-
ponderables rather than on abstract theories of law."'16 1
3. "When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
157. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
158. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jacksonr, J., concurring).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 637.
161. Id.
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."' 62
When such a direct confrontation occurs, the "[c]ourts can sus-
tain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disa-
bling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential
claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium
established by our constitutional system."163
Under the aforementioned analysis, the first inquiry must scru-
tinize the nature of the invocation of the executive privilege. As-
signing such a label to the claim will outline both the supportive
and counter policies surrounding the invocation. Secondly, once
the nature of the claim is established, the congressional statute
should be examined to determine the appropriate judicial latitude
which can fairly be attributed to the invocation. 164
B. The Rise of the Imperial Presidency
Our constitutional system of government is premised upon the
notion of conflict. However, a system of checks and balances is
only effective if each branch actually exercises its constitutionally
granted powers. In the last two centuries, the Presidency has
grown to proportions never originally contemplated, thus precipi-
tating a corresponding reduction in the power of Congress.165
162. Id.
163. Id. at 637-38 (footnote omitted).
164. These categories were never intended to be conclusive. Such an interpre-
tation completely misreads Justice Jackson's purpose. Rather, they serve as some
form of guidance in an otherwise undefined "twilight" zone of Presidential power.
Justice Jackson's opinion should be granted particular deference in light of the
fact that he had at one time personally advocated directly for the executive power.
Justice Jackson, named to the Court by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was the
Attorney General of the United States at the time of his nomination. Thus, this
Article III Justice was also very much aware of the power, and potential abuse
thereof, of individuals in the Article II branch. See 343 U.S. at 635-54 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
165. At best, the Presidency was intended as a check on the legislative exercise
of power-a co-equal balance, provided with the executive veto power. At worst,
he was intended merely to act as the enforcement branch of the legislature. See
supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text. Justice Jackson offered his view as to
the reason for the reallocation of power.
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single head in
whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of public
hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his decisions so
far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public eye and
ear. No other personality in public life can begin to compete with him in
access to the public mind through modern methods of communications.
By his prestige as head of state and his influence upon public opinion he
exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed to check and balance his
power which often cancels their effectiveness.
343 U.S. at 653-54.
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This consequence is perhaps not so much a result of presidential
usurpation as it is a matter of congressional abdication.
In all of their wisdom, the founding fathers could not envision
everything the future would hold. Global satellite communica-
tion, nuclear warfare, and the uncontrolled growth of the bureau-
cracy were never imagined. Contemporary America created a
need for instantaneous decisions. Such decisions involve both na-
tional and foreign concerns. But it was primarily the growth of
the President's power in the latter concern that allowed the Presi-
dency to take on superconstitutional dimensions.166 Such a shift
caused an erosion of both the expressed checks found within the
Constitution and the implied checks found within the practical re-
alities of a tripartite governing system. The author shares the
opinion of Mr. Schlesinger that "[t]he answer to the runaway
Presidency is not the messenger-boy Presidency. The American
democracy must discover a middle ground between making the
President a czar and making him a puppet ... we need a strong
Presidency-but a strong Presidency within the Constitution."167
C. Interbranch Litigation: United States v. House of
Representatives
1. The Controversy
United States v. House of Representatives168 provides an un-
precedented and interesting study into interbranch litigation and
the political abuse prevalent within governmental litigation. The
central hub of the commencement of the activity was a congres-
sional contempt citation.169 In the fall of 1982, several House sub-
166. Arthur Schlesinger, in commenting on the growth of the Imperial Presi-
dency, wrote that:
The assumption of that power by the Presidency was gradual and usu-
ally under the demand or pretext of emergency .... As it took place,
there dwindled away checks, both written and unwritten, that had long
held the Presidency under control. The written checks were in the Consti-
tution. The unwritten checks were in the forces and institutions a Presi-
dent once had to take into practical account before he made decisions of
war and peace - the cabinet and the executive branch itself, the Con-
gress, the judiciary, the press, public opinion at home and the opinion of
the world. By the early 1970s the American President had become on is-
sues of war and peace the most absolute monarch (with the possible ex-
ception of Mao Tse-tung of China) among the great powers of the world.
A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIML PRESIDENCY iX (1973).
167. Id. at x (emphasis in original).
168. 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983) (order dismissing the suit).
169. H. R. Res. 632, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 10,040 (1982) (on De-
committees began investigating the Environmental Protection
Agency's [hereinafter EPA] action, or more appropriately inac-
tion, concerning the $1.6 billion "superfund" program; a bill
designed to clean up hazardous waste sites and prosecute illegal
dumpers of toxic wastes.170 On November 22, 1982, the House
Public Works and Transportation Committee, chaired by Elliott
H. Levitas, subpoenaed EPA documents relating to the inquiry.
Anne McGill Burford, the EPA's Director, declined to turn over
certain documents, relying, she stated, on President Reagan's in-
vocation of executive privilege on the grounds that the documents
contained sensitive enforcement information. On December 16,
1982, the full House voted to charge Mrs. Burford with contempt
of Congress, the first such citation of an executive official by
Congress.171
The Attorney General, William French Smith, and the Depart-
ment of Justice acted immediately. Dissatisfied with his minor
"messenger boy" role in the affair,172 the Attorney General de-
clined to turn the contempt citation over to a grand jury as re-
quired by statutory mandate. Instead, he elected to sue the
House of Representatives in the name of the United States of
America. 173 The lawsuit was dismissed by Judge Smith. His deci-
sion urged the administration and congressional leaders to work
cember 16, 1982, the Speaker of the House certified the report of the Committee on
Public Works and Transportation as to the contumacious conduct of Anne M. Gor-
such, the Administrator of the EPA, for refusing to furnish documents in compli-
ance with a subpoena duces tecum from a duly constituted subcommittee. The
matter was subsequently referred, pursuant to statute, to the United States Attor-
ney for the District of Columbia).
170. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). This act defined liability and
compensation for injuries occurring due to hazardous substance use.
171. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1983, at A13, col. 3. The request for documents
was not a minor matter. In order to attempt to comply, at least with the vast ma-
jority of the documents required by the subpoena, the EPA had offered to produce
or make available for copying by the subcommittee approximately 787,000 pages of
documents, at a cost of approximately $223,000, and requiring an expenditure of
more than 15,000 personnel hours. However, the EPA refused to turn over a small
number of documents on the grounds that it would endanger enforcement proce-
dures. See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 4, United States v. House of Reps.,
556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
172. His role was simply to see to it that the United States Attorney for the Dis-
trict of Columbia present the citation to a grand jury. See 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1976)
(this article will generally only refer to the Attorney General and not to the United
States Attorney entrusted with the actual prosecution. The United States Attor-
ney General acts primarily as an administrator over the personnel of the Depart-
ment of Justice. The actions of the U.S. Attorney, at least in this matter, are fairly
attributable to the actions or policies of the Attorney General).
173. United States v. House of Reps., 556 F. Supp. 150, 151 (D.D.C. 1983). Actu-
ally, the original complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The Depart-
ment of Justice subsequently filed an amended complaint seeking only
declaratory relief.
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out a compromise for access to the documents withheld by the
EPA.174 Ultimately, after a series of negotiations and the revela-
tion of damaging infonation concerning the EPA, the executive
privilege claim was withdrawn and the documents were made
available to Congress. 17 5
The abstract of the performance is certainly interesting, yet, it
is the performance by the players which makes the drama truly
intriguing. The role of Congress is an uncertain one. On the one
hand, Congress, most admirably, challenged the executive and
came out the apparent. victor. It chose to issue a contempt cita-
tion against an executive officer for the first time.176 Subse-
quently, it continued to pressure the executive for access to
requested documents despite the presidential invocation of exec-
utive privilege. Congress even successfully resisted a lawsuit
brought by the Justice Department in an attempt to block its con-
tempt citation.
On the other hand, Congress did not demand that the Justice
Department enforce the contempt citation;177 it did not transfer
the citation to another United States Attorney;178 it did not pur-
174. Id. at 153.
175. During the course of the congressional investigation, additional informa-
tion became available bringing into question the propriety of the actions of both
the EPA and the Justice Department. Allegations of perjury, conflict of interest,
and obstruction of justice flourished. The subcommittees continued to remain sus-
picious that important records may have been lost or destroyed by agency paper
shredders, installed only after the subcommittees pressed for releases of the docu-
ments. Questioned as to why two extra paper shredders had been installed at the
last minute, EPA enforcement counsel Eugene Lucero replied that it simply
"seemed like a good idea." Subcommittee Chairman Elliott Levita's reply: "It's
got to be one of the stupider actions I've ever heard of-moving a [paper] shred-
der in ... after a subpoena and a contempt of Congress vote." See The Toxic Tar
Baby at Reagan's EPA, Newsweek, Feb. 28, 1983, at 14-15.
176. See supra note 169.
177. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1983, at Al, col. 6, and B12, col. 1. The resignation
of Mrs. Burford (Ms. Gorsuch married and became Mrs. Burford during the EPA
controversy) on March 9, 1983 explains Congress' lack of action subsequent to this
date, but it does not explain the inaction from February 3, 1983 (the date the law-
suit was dismissed by Judge Smith) to March 9, 1983. In defense, Congress was
involved in negotiations with the executive for the disclosure of documents and, in
this situation, the methods of Congress were successful. The affair served to
demonstrate the importance of the nonconstitutional checks and balances inher-
ent in our political system.
178. The statute requires the action to be turned over to the "appropriate
United States Attorney." Apparently allowing for a transfer to a more appropriate
United States Attorney, i.e., one who would enforce the contempt citation. The
statute formerly required presentation to only the "District Attorney for the Dis-
sue the citation after the dismissal of the lawsuit;179 it did not util-
ize its own inherent common law contempt power;180 and it did
not seek the impeachment of any executive officers. Rather, it
was to settle for the resignation of a minor player, Mrs. Bur-
ford.181 On balance, however, Congress managed to successfully
obtain the information it requested within a reasonable time pe-
riod and without further erosion of its constitutional powers.
The President's handling of the affair was also the subject of
criticism.182 In an apparent attempt to strengthen the executive
privilege doctrine, President Reagan has, if anything, impaired
the doctrine. His pendulum-like attempt to expand the privilege
to matters concerning environmental management by the EPA
has resulted in a reactive motion, at least for the present, to con-
tract the strength of the doctrine. 83 The attempted expansion
was premised on several misconceptions. First, there was the at-
tempt to extend executive privilege to matters clearly within the
internal oversight functions of the Congress. While the privilege
may have some vitality concerning matters of national security-
trict of Columbia." See Moreland, supra note 39, at 204-05 (reference to 2 U.S.C.
§ 194 (1976)).
179. See supra note 177.
180. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
181. Mrs. Burford was referred to as the "Ice Queen" throughout the entire
EPA affair. As noted by one author.
The career of Anne Gorsuch as head of the Environmental Protection
Agency is proof, in the eyes of her critics, that bad intentions alone are
never enough: it takes incompetence and arrogance as well to seriously
weaken in two years what it took a decade to build. Behind the public
demeanor - the forceful intelligence even her enemies have come to re-
spect, the "Ice Queen" stare as cold as a faceful of acid rain - there is, at
bottom, a two-term Colorado legislator with virtually no environmental ex-
perience at the head of one of the most sensitive agencies in the federal
government. The result is not merely that she has, in the opinion of for-
mer EPA assistant administrator William Drayton, "demolish [ed] the na-
tion's environmental management capacity"; it is, in the words of a key
administration official, who has watched the Superfund scandal spread
like dioxin from a leaky barrel, "a bleeping disaster."
Adler, Ice Queen Under Fire, Newsweek, Feb. 21, 1983, at 24.
182. A large part of the EPA's failings were attributed to the President. For ex-
ample, see Reagan's Toxic Turmoi Newsweek, Feb. 21, 1983, at 22-23; Storm Over
the Environmen4 Newsweek, Mar. 7, 1983, at 16-24. Additionally, it may be that the
Justice Department and the White House had "set up" Mrs. Burford to act as a
test case to extend executive privilege. It was only after the advice of the Justice
Department and insistence of the President that she refused to turn over the doc-
uments on grounds of executive privilege. Having lost the executive privilege bat-
tle, President Reagan withdrew the invocation leaving Mrs. Burford to fend for
herself. The issue had become too "hot" and Mrs. Burford had become a political
liability.
183. By pressing for the extension of executive privilege in such uncharted wa-
ters and then subsequently withdrawing the invocation, the President has only
raised the confidence of those who will seek to challenge future invocations of the
privilege.
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areas within the President's exclusive jurisdiction-the privilege
would hardly seem to exist over matters concerning the pollution
of America's interior. It is Congress, and not the President, which
has the balance of power in this area.l8 4
Second, the President misconstrued the nature of the privilege.
In a memorandum to the House subcommittees, the President
presented an elaborate series of procedures that would be imple-
mented prior to the invocation of the privilege. 8 5 Apparently, the
184. When enforcing congressional statutes, the President is essentially acting
as a de facto agent for Congress. See supra notes 131-33, 171-75 and accompanying
text.
185. The President set out a list of procedures which he stated "shall be fol-
lowed whenever congressional requests for information raise concerns regarding
the confidentiality of the information sought":
1. Congressional requests for information shall be complied with as
promptly and as fully as possible, unless it is determined that compliance
raises a substantial question of executive privilege. A "substantial ques-
tion of executive privilege" exists if disclosure of the information re-
quested might significantly impair the national security (including the
conduct of foreign relations), the deliberative processes of the Executive
Branch or other aspects of the performance of the Executive Branch's
constitutional duties.
2. If the head of an executive department or agency ("Department
Head") believes, after consultation with department counsel, that compli-
ance with a Congressional request for information raises a substantial
question of executive privilege, he shall promptly notify and consult with
the Attorney General through the Assistant Attorney General for the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel, and shall also promptly notify and consult with the
Counsel to the President. If the information requested of a department or
agency derives in whole or in part from information received from another
department or agency, the latter entity shall also be consulted as to
whether disclosure of the information raises a substantial question of ex-
ecutive privilege.
3. Every effort shall be made to comply with the Congressional request
in a manner consistent with the legitimate needs of the Executive Branch.
The Department Head, the Attorney General, and the Counsel to the
President may, in the exercise of their discretion in the circumstances, de-
termine that executive privilege shall not be invoked and release the re-
quested information.
4. If the Department Head, the Attorney General or the Counsel to the
President believes, after consultation, that the circumstances justify invo-
cation of executive privilege, the issue shall be presented to the President
by the Counsel to the President, who will advise the Department Head
and the Attorney General of the President's decision.
5. Pending a final Presidential decision on the matter, the Department
Head shall request the Congressional body to hold its request for the in-
formation in abeyance. The Department Head shall expressly indicate
that the purpose of this request is to protect the privilege pending a Presi-
dential decision, and that the request itself does not constitute a claim of
privilege.
6. If the President decides to invoke executive privilege, the Department
Head shall advise the requesting Congressional body that the claim of ex-
ecutive privilege is being made with the specific approval of the President.
rationale behind the scheme was that if there was a consensus
within the executive branch that the materials deserved the pro-
tection of executive privilege, its invocation must truly be correct.
This concept misconstrues the doctrine of executive privilege. If
such a power does exist, it is the nature of the information that
warrants the privilege, not approval by all the king's horses and
all the king's men.186 Additionally, the President was forced to ad-
mit that, even though he had invoked the privilege for the subpoe-
naed documents, he had never actually examined the documents
himself.187
In contrast, the role of the court was admirable. Rather than
diving head-first into an undeveloped confrontation, it dismissed
the lawsuit, urging a spirit of compromise between the co-equal
branches.188
2. Beyond Discretion to Interference
The most interesting role in this constitutional drama is that of
the Attorney General. The nature of the office itself is ripe for
conflict of interest in that the occupant of the office serves three
masters.189 Yet by definition, the Attorney General is an "attor-
ney". As an attorney he is expected to act as an advocate on be-
half of his client's best interests, within the limit of legal ethics.190
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject:
Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional Requests for Information, from
President Ronald Reagan (Nov. 4, 1982). See Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at Ap-
pendix, United States v. House of Reps., 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
186. See supra notes 131-33, 171-75 and accompanying text.
187. See Storm Over the Environment, Newsweek, Mar. 7, 1983, at 17. The entire
course of the Justice Department actions is questionable. Its desire to invoke ex-
ecutive privilege over such unimportant documents is dubious at best; its motiva-
tions are unknown. Perhaps the invocation was to act as a test case for an
extension of the privilege, but critics have charged that the real motive of the ad-
ministration was to limit the functions of congressional oversight committees-a
concern of some validity (44 subcommittees claim jurisdiction over the EPA
alone). Charges continue that Attorney General Smith may be guilty of ob-
structing justice by putting political loyalty before constitutional duty. Regardless
of the intentions of the administration and the Justice Department, the decisions
in the words of House General Counsel Stanley Brand, "shows bad judgment and
poor legal advice." Id.
The use of the privilege concerning documents never examined by the Presi-
dent renders the invocation of the privilege questionable at best. If such a power
as "executive privilege" does exist, it must exist within the office of the President,
not any employee of the administration. Consequently, it must be the President,
and the President alone, who shall be allowed, if at all, to invoke the privilege. See
supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
188. United States v. House of Reps., 556 F. Supp. at 153.
189. See supra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
190. The Department of Justice disagrees with this position:
[T]he issue is not so much one of ethics ... as comity. Where a legisla-
tive codefendant has been made aware of a contrary Department of Jus-
tice view, retains its own counsel on that issue, and requests the
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His client, by statute, is the "United States."'' 1 Accordingly, any
conflict of interest concerning his loyalty towards the executive
and the United States must ultimately be resolved in favor of the
broader duty owed to his principal client, the United States.
The interest of the United States in interbranch litigation is not
easily identified. The United States clearly has an interest in the
enactment of legislation, the enforcement of presumptively valid
legislation, and the subsequent punishment of statutory violators.
This interest is clear and distinct. It is at least equal to, and ar-
guably superior to, any presidential claim of executive privilege.
In interbranch litigation, it is unwarranted to claim that the nar-
row interests of the executive fully represent the broader inter-
ests of the United States. Thus, if the Attorney General chooses
to bring suit at all, it would appear more appropriate to bring the
action in the name of the executive: President v. Congress, not in
the name of the United States.19 2
The Attorney General had two roles to play in the EPA affair.
First, he, or more precisely, Mr. Harris, the United States Attor-
ney for the District of Columbia, was required to present a crimi-
nal case against the EPA Administrator to a grand jury.193 He
failed to do so. The prDpriety of this lack of action is questionable
at best because the unambiguous language of the federal statute
Department to continue representation on issues where there is no differ-
ence of opinion, the precise manner of submitting the Attorney General's
views becomes one of accommodation and not ethics.
Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1976). The Department of Justice was referring to Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), where it submitted its so-called amicus brief on behalf of
the Federal Election Comnidssion. The first four sections of the brief did contain
an amicus brief; however, the fifth section took the role of advocate and argued
that the statute should be declared unconstitutional.
191. 28 U.S.C. § 517 (1976) (the Attorney General, or his delegate, shall attend
to the interests of the "United States"); 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976) (the statute grants
original jurisdiction over all suits brought by the "United States").
192. On November 14, 1978, the Department of Justice Appropriation Authoriza-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 95-624, 92 Stat. 3459 (Fiscal Year 1979) received final congres-
sional approval. Section 13 was a result of an amendment introduced by
Congressman Elliot Levitas. Section 13 requires the Department of Justice to re-
lay to Congress a report within thirty days concerning any statute which the De-
partment believes is unconstitutional. Additionally, the Act required the
Department of Justice to declare in court that it is only representing the position
of the executive branch and not the position of the "United States." For a discus-
sion of the Act, see Miller & Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Powers Problem,
40 OHio ST. L.J. 51, 76-80 (1979).
193. See 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1976).
imposes a "duty" to commence a grand jury proceeding.194 In his
defense, the Department of Justice claimed absolute pros-
ecutorial discretion in this matter.95 However, the Attorney Gen-
eral chose another role to play. He went beyond his discretionary
boundaries and arguably entered the realm of direct interference.
The Attorney General, in an attempt to block a valid contempt
citation from Congress, filed a civil lawsuit against the House of
Representatives of the United States: United States v. House of
Representatives.196 The complaint alleged that "the President
[had) concluded that dissemination of [EPA] documents would
impair his solemn responsibility to enforce the law."'19 7 The
standing of the United States was alleged to exist because:
[t]he acts of [the House and its members] . . .have injured plaintiffs
[U.S. and Anne Gorsuch] by impairing their ability to meet their obliga-
tion to execute the laws of the United States faithfully, by impeding them
in the lawful exercise of the powers conferred upon the Executive Branch
by the Constitution and ... creating inconsistent obligations, and by dam-
aging their reputation for obedience to the rule of law.198
The question raised by these allegations is whether this action
can be said to be fairly attributable to the interests of the United
States. In United States of America v. American Telephone and
Telegraph, 199 the court was faced with a similar question as to the
propriety of the Attorney General's attempt to secure jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1345-the section granting jurisdiction to suits
brought by the United States. 200 The Department of Justice had
sought an injunction to prevent AT&T from complying with a sub-
poena issued by a House subcommittee. The information sought
concerned warrantless "national security" wiretaps. The Attor-
ney General commenced the action under the name of the United
States, allegedly to protect the "public interest." The court, al-
though finding jurisdiction to exist,201 expressed concerns over
194. Id.
195. Telephone interview with Lewis K. Wise, Attorney for the Department of
Justice (approximately Feb. 7, 1983).
Mr. Harris, the United States Attorney delegated the duty to prosecute, stated
that "I was the one who had to decide what to do .... I didn't discuss it, and no
one else did either." Mr. Harris stated that he felt he could not simultaneously
prosecute the EPA Chief and play a role in the civil suit challenging the validity of
the citation against her. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1983, at A13, col. 6.
196. 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
197. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 5, United States v. House of Reps., 556 F.
Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
198. Id. at 7.
199. 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976) provides jurisdiction for suits brought by the United
States. For an analysis of the AT&T case, see Comment, United States v. AT&T
Judicially Supervised Negotiations and Political Questions, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 466
(1977).
201. The suit was also brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), which provides ju-
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"whether a suit is brought 'by the United States' within § 1345
when the executive branch is seeking to enjoin the legislative
branch."202
Recent allegations made by the Attorney General in the EPA
matter that he is representing the interests of the United States
are even more dubious. The only inherent exclusive representa-
tion the executive holds on behalf of the United States concerns
matters of foreign policy and national security.20 3 The EPA mat-
ter, on the other hand, involves only internal domestic enforce-
ment policies.
Thus, in addition to the normal invasions by the President into
areas of traditional congressional control, the Attorney General,
through the Department of Justice, not only refused to prosecute
a valid congressional contempt citation, but elevated his status to
that of an independent challenger of the authority of Congress.
As an attorney for the United States, this course was
unwarranted.
Such action has not gone unnoticed by Congress. On December
27, 1982, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation,
after notification from the United States Attorney that he would
not prosecute the EPA Administrator, called for the impeachment
of the Attorney General and the United States Attorney.20 4 Stan-
ley M. Brand, general counsel to the Clerk of the House, has
stated that the failure to present the case to a grand jury "might
be an obstruction of justice to try to control [the] faithful dis-
charge of [the duty to see the laws faithfully executed] .,205
3. Can the United States Sue the United States?
The simple answer is no-the United States cannot sue the
risdiction for cases "aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. .." (the statute at the time of the litigation had a $10,000 minimum
amount in controversy requirement, which has subsequently been removed). The
court found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and failed to rule on the issue of
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345. See 651 F.2d at 388-89.
202. Id. at 389.
203. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (Pres-
ident is the sole authority with respect to foreign affairs). The action brought
against the House of Representatives was alleged to have jurisdiction under
§§ 1331 and 1345. See Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 1, United States v. House
of Reps., 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
204. Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts at 4, United States v. House of
Reps., 556 F. Supp. at 203.
205. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1983, at A13, col. 6.
United States. Based upon technical and historical grounds, no
one is permitted to sue himself.206 The principle is applicable not
only to natural persons but to artificial persons as well, e.g., corpo-
rations, and by logical inference, states.
The nation was first given life as a legislative body in October,
1774, when the First Continental Congress created the "Declara-
tions and Resolves of the First Continental Congress." 20 7 Prior to
the adoption of the 1787 Constitution, all acts of the nation were
executed in the person of the Congress. 208 As noted by one com-
mentator, "the signature of the Association by members of Con-
gress may be considered as the commencement of the American
Union."20 9 But this Congress was an incomplete creature. It was
denied the power to enforce its own legislation. Thus, even
though Congress could call for money from the states, it was
forced to wait until the states chose to voluntarily comply. Hamil-
ton noted that Congress, having "total want of sanction to its
laws,"210 made its resolutions mere recommendations which the
states observe or disregard at their option.2 11
Not surprisingly, one of the paramount concerns of the Consti-
tutional Convention was to provide Congress with the means to
enforce its acts. For instance, delegate Sherman thought that the
executive should be a mere extension of Congress, an agent of
sorts, responsible for the enforcement of congressional mandates
and accountable directly to the legislature.212 The original "Ran-
dolph Plan" went so far as to provide for the election of the exec-
utive by the legislature. This plan was eventually rejected, but it
is worthy of note that the plan received majority approval
throughout the Convention.213
The final plan was that of a series of checks and balances. 21 4 As
noted by one author, it was an attempt "to achieve a balance be-
tween efficiency and tyranny."21 5 The point of this review is not
206. See Miller & Bowman, supra note 192, at 72.
207. H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 82 (5th ed. 1959).
208. At that time, Congress was the body of the Union. Accordingly, Congress
was the only entity capable of acting on behalf of the United States. See H. HOCK-
ETr, PoLrCAL AND SOCIAL GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES 246 (1933).
209. 3 R. HILDRETH, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 46 (1982).
210. THE FEDERALIST, No. 2, at 186 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (empha-
sis added).
211. THE FEDERALIST, No. 15, at 158 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
212. See J. MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 5 (G.
Hunt, J. Scott eds. 1920); THE FEDERALIST, No. 15, at 157 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright
ed. 1961).
213. See generally E. DUMBAuLD, THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 255-
63 (1968).
214. See Miller & Bowman, supra note 192, at 61-62.
215. Id. at 61.
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to suggest that the present is bound by the ideas of the past. The
recognition is simply one of perspective.
The United States is therefore a "metaphysical entity."216 It ex-
ists only in constitutional theory, not as a definable physical en-
tity. It is the sum of the Congress, the executive, and the
judiciary. However, it is also a nation and a people. Legally, it is
the creation of a government of delegated powers from the popu-
lace. It has a legal interest which it has a right to protect in the
courts of law. Its interests may be governmental, proprietary, or
foreign in nature. When threatened by another, a delineation of
the rights of the United States vis-a-vis a citizen or corporation
may not be overly complex. However, the respective branches of
the United States may turn on one another. The interest of the
United States in interbranch disputes becomes much more diffi-
cult to define. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, to bestow the
status of the United States upon any one branch.2 17 The great
seal of the United States is not one banner, but three. Each
branch is entrusted with its own shield to bear; its own piece of
the constitutional pie. Therefore, in interbranch confrontations
the United States may not have any role to play.2 18
a. The Problem of Standing
Article III of the Constitution establishes as a condition prece-
dent to litigation within the judicial branch a case or controversy
which must exist before the court has jurisdiction over a particu-
lar dispute. 219 Beyond the limited constitutional "case or contro-
versy" requirement, however, the Supreme Court has formulated
certain providential standing requirements. The first requirement
is that a plaintiff must demonstrate, through sufficient allegation,
an "injury in fact." 220 Second, the plaintiff must allege a causal
216. Id. at 63.
217. Miller and Bowman have advanced the argument that the United States
simply has no interest in interbranch litigation. The President has an interest in
maintaining executive privilege and Congress has an interest in seeing to the en-
forcement of its statutes. Therefore, "[the interest of 'the United States,' if any-
thing, is the interest . . . of constitutional provisions and in adequate, responsive
government." Id. at 67-68.
218. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
220. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976); Associ-
ation of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). The re-
quirement has two benefits; it not only serves to preclude unnecessary litigation
but it also allows for the granting of narrow relief which will not be broader than is
link between the action of the defendant and the harm suf-
fered, 22 1 which is nothing more than a logical nexus requirement.
Finally, the alleged injury must be of a type "likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision."222 As a natural corollary to this
prerequisite, a requirement that the alleged infringement be
demonstrated as arguably within the zone of interests protected
or regulated by the Constitution or by statute has often been
included.223
The American judicial system allows for not only the initiation
of suits by private individuals, but also by individuals acting in
some form of official capacity, e.g., guardians ad litem or trustees
in bankruptcy. 224 Congressmen, as individuals and officials, have
seized upon this concept and brought suits alleging an injury to
their official capacity.225 Viewed as such, when the effectiveness
of the Congress is impaired, the imputation of the injury to each
congressman seems a logical extension. As a member of Con-
gress, any diminution of Congress' interests has a pro rata impact
upon a congressman's effectiveness as a legislator. Since his
harm is only derivative from that of the parent body, the observa-
tion by the court in Kennedy v. Sampson226 that "the influence of
any one legislator upon the political process is in great measure
dependent upon the stature of the governmental branch of which
he is a member" appears to be accurate.
Kennedy v. Sampson involved a request by Senator Kennedy
for a declaratory judgment that a bill which he had voted for had
become law in spite of a presidential pocket veto. Kennedy's
standing was granted on the grounds that the indirect injury suf-
fered by members of Congress were in fact a "derivative, but...
nonetheless substantial" 2 27 personal injury. The Court stated that
required by the facts of the controversy before the court. By stating overly broad
holdings the Court only tends to unnecessarily bind itself to past decisions. Judi-
cial decisions need only decide the controversy before the court and leave the re-
maining issues to be decided another day. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974).
221. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 41-42.
222. Id. at 38.
223. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 205 n.68 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The
Supreme Court has continued to refer to the "zone of interest" requirement. See
Simon, 426 U.S. at 39 n.19. This so-called fourth requirement has been severely
criticized. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATivE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.02-11 (1976).
224. See 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.18-.20 (2d ed. 1974).
225. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Congressman Har-
rington sought an injunction to discontinue the use of secret funding and certain
reporting provisions of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949 used to conceal illegal
activities).
226. 511 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
227. Id. The court reasoned that to whatever extent the Congress itself was
damaged, so too were the interests of all of its members. Article I, section 7 of the
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when the powers of Congress were impaired, a concurrent dimi-
nution occurs to each congressman because his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of the
institution.228
The recognition of the participatory interest of each congress-
man depends on the powers and interests of the Congress itself.
Since Congress is not simply an enactor of laws, but has addi-
tional investigative and oversight functions, it would seem that
congressmen could suffer a derivative injury to these powers as
well. Although the courts have generally failed to expand the
standing of congressmen so broadly,22 9 the point is simply that
Congress, as well as its individual members, has a broad base of
power upon which an "'injury in fact" could be premised. Addi-
tionally, suits brought by individual congressmen are brought on
behalf of the individual affected, not in the name of the United
States.
The executive does not enjoy such a broad base of potential
standing.230 When viewed within the narrow context of executive
privilege, any assertions as to a particularized injury become
quite dubious. As the enforcer of the laws of Congress, any par-
ticular interests peculiar to the executive become quite finite.
Constitution had previously been construed to provide that once a bill is passed
by both houses and presented to the President less than ten days (excepting Sun-
days) before a sine die adjournment at the end of a session it does not become law
if it is not signed by the President. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929). The
theory is that because the President is prevented by the adjournment from re-
turning the bill to Congress if he objects to the legislation, he may "pocket" it, the
practical effect being the same as a formal veto. For a discussion of the "pocket
veto" at issue in Kennedy v., Sampson, see Comment, The Veto Power and Ken-
nedy v. Sampson-Burning a Hole in the President's Pocket, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 587
(1974).
228. 511 F.2d at 435-36.
229. The rejection of standing for a congressional plaintiff has generally been
upon separation of powers grounds, for although Congress is the maker of the law,
it is the executive who is ertrusted with its execution. Accordingly, a congress-
man's standing exists only concerning the pre-enactment stage of legislation. See,
e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1977). This pre-enactment
interest is only effected when the ability to enact legislation has been injured. See,
e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d at 212-13. However, such a narrow reading com-
pletely disregards congressional investigation and oversight functions. Note that
in none of these cases did the congressional plaintiffs bring suit in the name of the
United States. Rather, the actions were only brought in the name of the individual
litigants themselves.
230. The means whereby the legislative branch is able to interfere with the
functions of the executive are far more limited. Additionally, the President does
not share a reciprocal oversight function over the general operations of Congress.
First, the executive has the power to commence litigation which is
expressly authorized by statute.231 Second, the executive has an
interest in protecting the proprietary interests of the United
States. 232 Congress, lacking its own enforcement power, has en-
trusted the executive with the responsibility of protecting the
property interests of the United States. Finally, largely through
historical evolution, the executive has obtained a certain amount
of autonomy over foreign affairs. 233
b. The Political Question Doctrine
Even if a constitutional litigant manages to clear the standing
threshold, he must still avoid having the dispute dismissed as in-
volving a political question. The political question doctrine states
that, inter alia, under the constitutional scheme of separation of
powers, certain issues require resolution by the political branches
of the government, not the judiciary.23 4 Accordingly, should a
plaintiff present a political question to the courts, it should be dis-
missed as nonjusticiable. Under a closer examination, political
questions consist of the issues which are committed by the text of
the Constitution, either explicitly or implicitly, to the exclusive
control of a coordinate branch.23 5
In connection with the political question doctrine, the courts
231. As the "faithful" executor of the laws, this power is quite obvious. One
cannot faithfully execute the laws if they fail to commence prosecutions against
those who violate them.
232. The protection of property notion has been stretched so far as to allow the
President, through the Attorney General, to commence prosecutions for public
nuisance. For example, In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), granted a recognition of
the United States interest in ensuring its ability to ensure the safe transportation
of the mails. The Pullman Railroad Union, through certain officials, was ordered to
discontinue the strike. An action was commenced against Debs for his failure to
terminate the workers' strike.
233. For an expansive opinion on the strength of the President's own inherent
Article HI authority within the sphere of foreign affairs, see Justice Sutherland's
opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (the
office of the President is "the keeper of foreign affairs"). The President has his
own inherent Article II powers within the purview of foreign affairs-a sort of
built-in necessary and proper clause.
234. See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
235. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1959); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). There can be two possible situations
giving rise to the political question doctrine. First, where the court determines
that either the executive or the legislature has been granted exclusive jurisdiction
for the resolution of the issue in the controversy by virtue of a constitutional pro-
vision. Second, where the executive or the legislature challenges the propriety of
the actions of the other branch and the court determines that the co-equal branch
has not exceeded the scope of its textually granted constitutional power. See gen-
erally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); Henkin, Is There a "Political Ques-
tion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 606 (1976). The political question doctrine is not
the only nonjusticiable issue.
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have also vacillated between the notion of exercising judicial self-
restraint and acting as the final federal "umpire" in determining
the propriety of the exercises of power by the other two
branches.236 Merit can be found in either position. Besides creat-
ing a system of controversy, the founders envisioned a govern-
ment held together by a series of checks and balances. This is a
system which implies a degree of compromise. Two co-equal
branches should not require the resolution of their difficulties by
the third branch every time a dispute arises.237 Even when they
do request the action of the judiciary, the courts should realize
that not all controversies belong in the judicial system and dis-
miss those cases accordingly. On the other hand, as a branch
with a "duty" to determine what the law is, the court has an obli-
gation to resolve controversies which threaten the constitutional
allocation of power.
D. Obstacles to a Restoration of a Balance of Power
The inability of Congress to restore a balance of power is due to
two major factors: the concentration of power in the Presidency,
coupled with a concurrent abdication of that power by Congress.
The founding fathers never envisioned the resulting growth of
the Presidency. If anything, it was the fear of the legislature
which concerned the framers the most. In the Federalist No. 48,
Madison spoke of the dangers of tyranny inberent in the legisla-
tive branch.238 And, unlike Thomas Jefferson, Madison was un-
concerned that the judicial branch might overstep its own
boundaries. 239 History has proved Madison wrong. Even the judi-
cial branch has, in an ever-increasing fashion, sought additional
power while at the same time Congress has continued to surren-
der those powers entrusted to it by the Constitution.240
236. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (recognition of the textual commitment
doctrine as a constitutionally imposed judicial restraint on the power of review);
cf. United States v. Nixon, 4118 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974) (it is the "duty" of the Court
to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution-a duty which should not be
avoided merely because of a potential conflict between the co-equal branches).
Professor Choper has advanced the argument that in federalism and interbranch
litigation, any judicial intervention is improper. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).
237. 556 F. Supp. 150; see :upra note 168.
238. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48.
239. See P. KURLAND, supra note 9, at 163.
240. Id. For example, the line of decisions stemming from Lochner v. New
Philip Kurland has outlined three judicially created construc-
tions which have effectively enabled the executive branch to se-
cure the dominant position among the supposedly co-equal
constitutional branches. 241 The first judicial doctrine was that the
power over foreign affairs did not derive from the Constitution it-
self, but from the very nature of the national government. It was
not a delegated power, but rather, an inherent power of the Arti-
cle II branch. This was the view of Justice Sutherland in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.242 The power was not a
delegated power but an inheritance of the royal prerogative di-
rectly from our English antecedents. In the area of foreign affairs,
the power is "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of
the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations-a power which does not require as
a basis for its exercise an act of Congress ... "243
The second line of cases adding strength to the imperial presi-
dency was the Court's licensing of the power of the national ad-
ministration to completely occupy the field of government and
regulation, practically ignoring the existence of state powers in
this area. The expansion began with United States v. Butler, 244
where the Court found the general welfare clause of the Constitu-
tion to constitute a substantive grant of power to Congress. The
Butler decision chose the broader Hamiltonian construction of
the clause, finding a separate authority granted by the clause to
collect and spend money for the general welfare of the United
States.
A subsequent expansion of the commerce clause power further
enlarged the federal power to cover not only national, but most lo-
cal business activities. 24 5 Recent decisions have extended it to all
commercial activity, regardless of any demonstration of the indi-
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (judiciary sitting as a "super legislature"), and more re-
cently, decisions such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (where the Court is es-
sentially drafting an abortion statute).
241. P. KURLAND, supra note 9, at 172.
242. 299 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1936). Such a conclusion is supported by both logic
and necessity. However, it is the continued abuse of this power, coupled with
other expansions, which has jeopardized the constitutional scales.
243. Id. at 316-20.
244. 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (the Court was interpreting the general welfare clause -
"Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes ... to pay the debts and pro-
vide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
245. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (the Court found that even
"[h]ome-grown wheat . . .competes with wheat in commerce."); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (Ollie's Barbecue, a small family run restaurant
was found to be a business "plainly appropriate in the resolution of what the Con-
gress found to be a national commercial problem of the first magnitude.").
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vidual transactions with interstate commerce.246 This expansion
has left the federal government free to regulate practically any-
thing. Thus, a nation of delegated powers has evolved into a prac-
tical sovereignty.
Finally, there is the massive amount of delegation. The delega-
tion primarily involves a willing transfer of authority from Con-
gress to the executive. The transfer of power has grown to such a
degree that Congress has authorized the President to draft and
enact legislation, subject only to a possible congressional veto.247
The need for delegation has risen with the growth of bureaucracy.
However, continued delegations to independent agencies, with lit-
tle or no congressional guidance, has nonetheless been sustained
by the courts. For example, the Federal Communications Com-
mission was delegated the authority to license radio stations
whenever, in the view of the Commission, it was in the "public
convenience, interest or necessity" to do so. 246 Similarly, the In-
terstate Commerce Commission was authorized to set rates as
long as they were "just and reasonable." 249 This continued con-
gressional abdication of its constitutional powers only serves to
further strengthen the executive and weaken the legislature.
Thus, through abdication of its powers and a concurrent strength-
ening of the executive's power, Congress loses more and more of
its ability to correct the constitutional imbalance.
E. Avenues of Possible Congressional Remedies
Congress was intended to be dominant.25 0 However, a form of
constitutional Darwinism has decided otherwise. Political office
attracts ambition and that ambition can only be checked by the
ambition of another.25 ' Unchecked, the evolution of our nation,
along with an evolution of the constitutional balance of power,
has created the imperial presidency. But the shift of constitu-
246. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (extension of commerce
clause to loan sharking activity occurring solely within one state).
247. Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-17, 91 Stat. 29 (1977). The contin-
uing spiral growth of governmental bureaucracy has forced Congress to increas-
ingly delegate more and more responsibility to administrative agencies under the
executive branch.
248. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933) (the agency
is currently named the Federal Communications Commission).
249. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. 452, 476 (1910).
250. See supra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
251. A form of unwritten, human checks and balances. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
tional power is not yet fatal. Congress still has available potential
avenues of action to reset the constitutional scale. The shift did
not occur overnight and an immediate remedy is simply not possi-
ble.2 52 However, this is not an excuse for congressional inaction.
There are at least three courses of conduct available to Congress
to enable it to restore the constitutional balance against the ex-
pansion of the Presidency. The first avenue concerns strengthen-
ing its own branch, the second concerns checking the executive
branch, and the third concerns a restoration of the notion of com-
promise. The three are not mutually exclusive, but rather, neces-
sarily dependent on one another for their success.2 5 3
Congress needs to begin by strengthening its own internal pow-
ers and legal counsel. First, Congress needs an individual capa-
ble of fully representing congressional interests in the courts. 254
History has demonstrated that in times of interbranch conflict,
the Attorney General cannot be counted on; his ultimate loyalty
tends to lie with the President. 255
Second, Congress should create a more centralized mechanism
to keep Congress informed of exactly how the executive and judi-
cial branches are enforcing its laws.25 6 One problem facing cur-
rent congressional legislation is that, once enacted, legislation
tends to drift completely out of Congress' grasp. Moreover, once
out of reach, Congress permits the executive to distort the legisla-
ture's intended manner of enforcement and the judiciary to inde-
pendently interpret its spirit and purpose.25 7 Finally, if Congress
252. Jefferson wrote to Madison shortly before Washington's inauguration, stat-
ing "[t]he tyranny of the legislature is really the danger most to be feared, and
will continue to be so for many years to come. . . [but] [t]he tyranny of the ex-
ecutive power will come in its turn, but at a more distant period." Jefferson to
Madison, Mar. 15, 1789, quoted by ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
1, ch. 15. For a study on the growth of the imperial presidency see SCHLESINGER,
supra note 1.
253. Reshifting the balance of constitutional power is not a task for monomani-
acs, i.e., single minded individuals. The changes required two hundred years to
progress to this point and any attempted restoration of a balance of power will re-
quire an examination and pursuit of all possible remedies.
254. Congress has already taken the initial step of establishing the office. The
current General Counsel to the Clerk of the House is Stanley M. Brand. Congress
has also utilized the General Accounting Office as an effective means of congres-
sional oversight. However, to counter the executive, the legal counsel's office re-
quires supplementation and centralization of all congressional actions in order to
offset the power of the Department of Justice.
255. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (he is, of course, an execu-
tive cabinet officer who serves at the pleasure of the President).
256. See P. KuRLAND, supra note 9, at 196-97. 'This function could be performed
by the office of Congressional Legal Counsel. Congress would then be in a posi-
tion to redesign or restructure the governing legislation if its enforcement does not
truly conform to the legislative purpose and intent at the time of enactment." Id.
at 197.
257. The area of preemption, for example, has often turned into an area where
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is dissatisfied with the manner in which the Attorney General is
prosecuting, or failing to prosecute, its contempt citations (due to
a claimed ambiguity or any permissible discretion in the statute
itself), Congress should simply redraft 28 U.S.C. § 194 so that it
does not permit any discretion. 258
Secondly, Congress needs to find methods of effectively check-
ing the growth of the executive power. Always available, yet sel-
dom utilized, is the power of impeachment-unquestionably the
most awesome, though infrequently used, constitutional power
vested in the legislature.259 Stripped of its complexities, it is basi-
cally a political action, premised in legal terminology, aimed at
the removal of an official of the federal government. The problem
with the remedy is that it is an incredibly blunt instrument with
an ultimate sanction allowing no compromise. The point is that,
although not appropriate in all circumstances, the power does ex-
ist. Yet the power is only to be implemented in extreme emer-
gencies. This remedy is of no value to the daily confrontations
between the two branches.
Congress has debated whether or not to legislate on executive
privilege. 260 In 1973, the Senate Government Operations Commit-
tee reported a bill requiring all requested information to be dis-
closed unless the President, through a written order, required the
information to be withheld. The bill also provided for oversight of
the President's decision and for enforcement procedures. 26 1 The
bill passed in the Senate, and was sent to the House Government
Operations Committee. The Committee was sharply divided over
the courts are the ones deciding what Congress meant through its legislation. See,
e.g., Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147 (1963) (the
Court was unable to find an "unambiguous congressional mandate"); Campbell v.
Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) (finding an intention by Congress to preempt concur-
rent state regulation of the methods of labeling tobacco).
258. Congress is discussing this possibility again. "At the very least, says one
source on the Judiciary Committee, Congress is likely to revise the law so that an
attorney general has no choice but to follow through on a contempt-of-Congress
citation - even if the person cited is a fellow member of the administration."
Again, Executive Privilege, Newsweek, Mar. 7, 1983, at 18. Unfortunately, Con-
gress has yet to act.
259. Madison realized both the need and the power of impeachment. Corrup-
tion or loss of capacity in a President was "within the compass of probable events
.... Either of them might be fatal to the Republic." See DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRA-
TIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 417-19 (C. Tansill,
ed. 1927).
260. See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 152.
261. Id.
the wisdom of the legislation and it was never brought up on the
House floor.262
Those in support of the legislation felt it provided access to in-
formation "in a way which [balanced] the needs of the executive
... with the needs of the Congress .... It [gave] neither
branch a veto over the desires of the other, but [placed] the bur-
den of justifying any denials of information on the President."263
Those who opposed the bill did so for diametrically opposed rea-
sons. The Justice Department found the bill overly restrictive: "A
claim of executive privilege.., is essentially a presidential con-
stitutional responsibility; the form in which it is to be exercised
therefore is to be determined by the President and not by the
Congress." 264
A polar extreme apart, the other faction saw the legislation as
recognizing, not restricting, executive privilege. 265 All three argu-
ments contain some merit, but the entire question may be moot
because such legislation may be an unconstitutional encroach-
ment by the Congress into the executive sphere.266
At the risk of sounding inconsistent, as a final avenue of explo-
ration, Congress and the President should not forget the magic of
the spirit of compromise.267 Our constitutional government, as re-
minded by Justice Jackson, "enjoins upon its branches separate-
ness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."268
Unfortunately, Congress, and even the executive, have increas-
ingly relied on the courts as the forum to review the validity of
each other's actions. 269 Such a continued proliferation of litiga-
tion will undoubtedly have a number of effects upon the delicate
constitutional separation of powers.
262. The Committee feared that legislation on executive privilege would implic-
itly acknowledge the existence of the privilege in law. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. Attorney General Richard D. Kleindienst, during a hearing on April 10,
1973, stated his view that, "[ylour power to get what the President knows is in the
President's hands." Id. If not constitutionally correct, the statement is, if nothing
more, a practical assessment of the situation.
265. House Committee Chairman Chet Hatfield stated that "[t]his would be the
first time that the [executive privilege] doctrine would find its way into the statute
books." See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 152.
266. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized executive privilege as an in-
herent power of the Presidency. However, the Court also expressly failed to
render any determination on the validity of the privilege when confronted with a
congressional demand for information. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712
n.19. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
267. Quite simply, there is a time to remain strong and unyielding and a time to
compromise. Both are admirable qualities; they are not mutually exclusive.
268. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
269. See Note, Congress Versus the Executive: The Role of the Courts, 11 HARv.
J. ON LEGIS. 352 (1974).
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First, reliance on the courts as an arbiter for every interbranch
dispute will not only enlarge the power of the judiciary but also
reduce the powers of Congress. Ultimately it will only serve to in-
crease the politicization of the courts, requiring the determination
of essentially political, not legal questions.270 Second, it will only
serve to increase the separation between the executive and legis-
lative branch, essentially forcing more formalistic relationships
between the two branches, making compromise even more diffi-
cult. "The legal brief may become the substitute for the negoti-
ated compromise." 271
Continued reliance on the judicial branch to enforce congres-
sional decisions will also cause the transfer of Congress' powers.
This effect would be twofold: first, it would strengthen the judici-
ary; second, it would strengthen the executive, in that it would re-
late a feeling of weakness from Congress because of a reliance on
the courts to enforce, or at least pursue, actions the Congress
lacked the will to enforce.
Finally, judicial reliance would only serve to further fragment
an already divided Congress. 272 The process allows a junior legis-
lator to break ranks and turn to the judicial branch for a remedy
for his own personal grievance. Furthermore, should conflict arise
within the Congress on the issue, it would make almost impossi-
ble the task of the courts in determining which party truly repre-
sented the legislative branch, in addition to the obvious
dissension it would cause between the already divided respective
congressional factions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The constitutional allocation of powers is reaching a point of ir-
reparable imbalance. The foundations of our representational
government are slowly giving way under the increasing pressure
of the imperial presidency. The founding fathers feared such a
consolidation of power. Rather than establishing a parliament, a
king, or a czar, the founders entrusted the care of our nation to a
270. Id. at 400. Cf. Comment, Judiciary's Role in Mediating Political Conven-
tion Delegate Seating Disputes, 86 HARv. L. REV. 218, 223 (1972). Perhaps this is
what Justice Douglas feared when he stated that the courts should not become
ombudsmen in disputes between Congress and the executive. Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606, 639-40 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
271. See Note, supra note 269, at 401.
272. See id.
constitutional system of separation of powers. Not merely in-
tended as a parchment barrier, the doctrine was intended to be vi-
able and evolving. By establishing a system of checks and
balances, the feared growth of tyranny in one branch would con-
stantly be checked and kept in constitutional balance by the re-
maining two branches. The power to guarantee this balance was
not intended to come solely from a parchment known as the Con-
stitution; it was only to serve as a set of rules, a system of alloca-
tion of authority and responsibility to the respective players.
Rather, the drafters entrusted the governing of a nation to human
nature and provided a means to check the unharnessed ambition
of one individual against other individuals in differing branches of
government.
Congressional inertia has led to a distortion of the roles of both
the President and the United States Attorney General. It has
given rise to the imperial presidency, an office increasingly taking
on extraconstitutional dimensions. Some of the expansions of the
office's power occurred through necessity. The increasing
bureaucratization of our governmental system coupled with the
growing importance of global affairs has required a need for the
United States to be able to act rapidly and affirmatively through a
single voice. However, this necessary increase in stature does not
justify the continued defiance of the President toward the
Congress.
In the middle of the struggle between the executive and legisla-
tive branches is the Attorney General. An individual of both
political and legal loyalties, he has unfortunately too often placed
his primary loyalty with the former and neglected the latter. The
Attorney General has lost perspective of his proper constitutional
role. While owing allegiance to both the President and the United
States, in times of conflict he owes a duty to the interests of the
United Statesfirst, and a loyalty to the President second.
Unfortunately, the Attorney General is part of a political power
base. Our government today has distorted constitutional duty be-
cause of political loyalty. Accordingly, any correction of his role
must come from the Congress itself. As a creature of statute, the
office of Attorney General is realistically only open to legislative
remedy.
Justice Jackson stated his warnings over thirty years ago, that
"[i]f not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attrib-
uted to Napoleon that 'The tools belong to the man who can use
them.' We [the court] may say that power .. .belongs in the
hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power
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from slipping through its fingers." 273
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273. 343 U.S. at 654. The author would like to thank Professor Richard H.
Seeburger for his friendship, guidance, and assistance in the preparation of this
article. All viewpoints and opinions, however, should be attributed solely to the
wanderings of the author.

